Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation

-334- A Historical Analysis of Cadre
a better resourced Army Reserve (formerly the Organized Reserve) through the Reserve
Forces Act of 1955. The Organized Reserve was no longer a cadre force. In the 1960s,
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara led reforms to increase the readiness of all reserve
units and eventually eliminated all Army Reserve combat units. These changes gradually
eliminated any remaining cadre units that existed in the U.S. Army.
7.2.1—Reserve Forces Act of 1955
The Reserve Forces Act of 1955 ended the existence of the Organized Reserves as a
cadre force. With the passage of this act, the Army Reserve (formerly the Organized
Reserves) was to increase its personnel levels to near one-hundred percent of authorized
strength. This change occurred because the cadre structure of Army Reserve units prior to
1955 was seen by many as a major deficiency of the American military system. Secretary of
the Army Robert T. Stevins testified to Congress: “our reserve at the present is inadequate to
meet our needs. Its inadequacy is due primarily –yes, I can say almost solely- to the failure to
procure the participation of enlisted personnel in adequate numbers in organized units.” 220
The desire for high readiness reserve units was driven by the need to have a large pool of
trained manpower available quickly to defend against a Soviet invasion of Europe. 221 This
marked the end of explicit planning for cadre units in American military policy. However,
Crossland and Currie note that even with this new policy, the Army Reserve entered the
1960s under strength. 222
____________
220 Crossland and Currie (1984), p. 122
221 Many military professionals such as John McAuley Palmer had argued since 1945 that “technological
advances … had eliminated the grace of time and distance that had in the past permitted the nation the
opportunity to mobilize its untrained citizenry. Modern warfare needed a huge reservoir of trained men.”
[Stewart (2005b), p. 210]. Therefore, a reserve force with higher readiness was necessary.
222 Crossland and Currie (1984), p. 134