Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation
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Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation

Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation

rand.org
07.06.2014 Views

-322- A Historical Analysis of Cadre support.” 178 In 1921, Congress reduced the size of the Regular Army from the 280,000 called for by the NDA of 1920 to 150,000. 179 Congress further cut the size of the Army in 1922 to 125,000 and to 118,750 in 1927. 180 It was left up to the War Department as to how to make these personnel cuts. John McAuley Palmer explained that “it would obviously be impossible to retain all of the organizations that were created upon the passage of the National Defense Act of 1920.” 181 According to Palmer, there were two alternatives: the Washingtonian solution, “reduce the strength of the regular army proper, and leave the machinery for training and developing the citizen army intact,” or the Uptonian solution, “retain the nine infantry divisions though each would be merely an ineffective skeleton at greatly reduced strength.” 182 The General Staff favored the Uptonian solution and it was adopted by the War Department. 183 The Regular Army maintained the same number of units outlined by the National Defense Act of 1920. These units retained all officers but cut enlisted strength to meet the authorized size. The average enlisted to officer ratio fell from 18 between 1900 and 1916 to 10 between 1920 and 1939. 184 The Regular Army of the 1920s was a cadre force. A cadre Regular Army remained into the 1930s when General Douglas MacArthur took over as Army Chief of Staff. Weigley argues that MacArthur was troubled because he thought: “a Regular Army skeletonized in order to be expansible provided no force for ____________ 178 Weigley (1984), p. 400 179 This was a reduction from 261 troops per 100,000 residents to 140 troops per 100,000 residents. [U.S. Census Bureau (1975), p. 1140-1143 and U.S. Census Bureau (2002), p. A-1] 180 The reductions to 125,000 and 118,750 troops are equivalent to reductions to 116 troops per 100,000 residents and 111 troops per 100,000 residents respectively. [U.S. Census Bureau (1975), p. 1140-1143 and U.S. Census Bureau (2002), p. A-1] 181 Palmer (1941), p. 178 182 Palmer (1941), p. 178 183 Palmer (1941), p. 179. Note that since this was not a decision that affected the National Guard, Congress did not intervene. 184 U.S. Census Bureau (1975), p. 1140-1143

-323- A Historical Analysis of Cadre prompt readiness even to meet relatively small emergencies.” 185 MacArthur believed that the Army needed at least a moderate-sized rapid reaction force. During the 1930s, he argued for this rapid-reaction force in front of Congress on numerous occasions. 186 Congress rejected MacArthur’s plan, however, since it called for a Regular Army of 165,000, 187 a force much larger than Congress or the President was willing to pay for according to Weigley. 188 Although it appeared from this proposal that MacArthur was a cadre opponent, he responded to depression-induced budget cuts with a cadre proposal similar to those of Calhoun and Upton. In 1934, Lewis Douglas, Franklin Roosevelt’s budget chief directed that $90 million be trimmed from the military budget by furloughing “officers on half pay” and “stating that he intended to order between 3,000 and 4,000 army officers off active duty.” 189 Even though MacArthur earlier argued against a skeletonized force, he argued for a skeletonized force in this situation: “If you have to cut everything out of the National Defense Act, the last element should be the Officer Corps. If you had to discharge every soldier, if you had to do away with everything else, I would still professionally advise you to keep these 12,000 officers. They are the mainspring of the whole mechanism, each one of them would be worth a thousand men at the beginning of a war. They are the only ones who can take this heterogeneous mass and make it a homogeneous fighting group.” - General Douglas MacArthur, 1933 190 MacArthur’s argument sounds similar to those made by Calhoun and Upton. As expressed by Griffith: “MacArthur’s apparently callous reference to preferring enlisted cuts to officer reductions was clearly a reflection of Uptonian principles and reveals much about ____________ 185 Weigley (1984), p. 406 186 Weigley (1984), p. 407 187 This was the lowest estimate provided by the General staff for a force that would have “several instant readiness divisions” as well as “provide simultaneously a semblance of adequate garrisons for the outlying possessions of the United States.” [Weigley (1984), p. 407] 188 Weigley (1984), p. 407 189 Griffith (1982), p. 129 190 Griffith (1982), p. 129

-322- A Historical Analysis of <strong>Cadre</strong><br />

support.” 178 In 1921, Congress reduced the size of the Regular <strong>Army</strong> from the 280,000 called<br />

for by the NDA of 1920 to 150,000. 179 Congress further cut the size of the <strong>Army</strong> in 1922 to<br />

125,000 and to 118,750 in 1927. 180 It was left up to the War Department as to how to make<br />

these personnel cuts. John McAuley Palmer explained that “it would obviously be impossible<br />

to retain all of the organizations that were created upon the passage of the National Defense<br />

Act of 1920.” 181 According to Palmer, there were two alternatives: the Washingtonian<br />

solution, “reduce the strength of the regular army proper, and leave the machinery for<br />

training and developing the citizen army intact,” or the Uptonian solution, “retain the nine<br />

infantry divisions though each would be merely an ineffective skeleton at greatly reduced<br />

strength.” 182 The General Staff favored the Uptonian solution and it was adopted by the War<br />

Department. 183 The Regular <strong>Army</strong> maintained the same number of units outlined by the<br />

National Defense Act of 1920. These units retained all officers but cut enlisted strength to<br />

meet the authorized size. The average enlisted to officer ratio fell from 18 between 1900 and<br />

1916 to 10 between 1920 and 1939. 184 The Regular <strong>Army</strong> of the 1920s was a cadre force.<br />

A cadre Regular <strong>Army</strong> remained into the 1930s when General Douglas MacArthur<br />

took over as <strong>Army</strong> Chief of Staff. Weigley argues that MacArthur was troubled because he<br />

thought: “a Regular <strong>Army</strong> skeletonized in order to be expansible provided no force for<br />

____________<br />

178 Weigley (1984), p. 400<br />

179 This was a reduction from 261 troops per 100,000 residents to 140 troops per 100,000 residents. [U.S.<br />

Census Bureau (1975), p. 1140-1143 and U.S. Census Bureau (2002), p. A-1]<br />

180 The reductions to 125,000 and 118,750 troops are equivalent to reductions to 116 troops per 100,000<br />

residents and 111 troops per 100,000 residents respectively. [U.S. Census Bureau (1975), p. 1140-1143 and U.S.<br />

Census Bureau (2002), p. A-1]<br />

181 Palmer (1941), p. 178<br />

182 Palmer (1941), p. 178<br />

183 Palmer (1941), p. 179. Note that since this was not a decision that affected the National Guard, Congress<br />

did not intervene.<br />

184 U.S. Census Bureau (1975), p. 1140-1143

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