Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation
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Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation

Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation

rand.org
07.06.2014 Views

-318- A Historical Analysis of Cadre grown to 3,685,458 officers and men, more than 17 times larger than the army that existed before the war. 159 After the war, army planners began considering how to prepare for future wars of similar size. 160 Initially, the Army proposed a cadre force similar to that proposed by Emory Upton. Congress opposed this plan because it did not include the National Guard. Instead, Congress modified a proposal written by John McAuley Palmer. Palmer’s proposal became the National Defense Act (NDA) of 1920. The NDA of 1920 rejected the Uptonian cadre force but created a new type force, which would become, without explicitly planning for it, a cadre force. This cadre force would be different from those proposed in the past, as it existed alongside, not in replacement of, the National Guard. 5.1.1—The Post-War Debate Following the end of World War I, the War Department recommended a peacetime cadre army. Chief of Staff Peyton March proposed a permanent Regular Army of 500,000 men “skeletonized to about 50 per cent of its strength … with a system of universal military training which will ensure an adequate reserve.” 161 This proposal was unacceptable to Congress. 162 Congress was frustrated by the lack of a plan that considered its desire to have ____________ 159 Kreidberg and Henry (1955), p. 246. In relative terms, the size of the army grew from 210 troops per 100,000 residents to 3593 troops per 100,000 residents. [U.S. Census Bureau (1975), p. 1140-1143 and U.S. Census Bureau (2002), p. A-1] 160 After WWI there was significant public disagreement over national defense policy. Some argued for a return to isolationism while others argued for a larger or more rapidly expandable military. The War Department focused on planning total mobilization [Kreidberg and Henry (1956), p. 382]. Weigley argues that: “the Army’s leaders had to reckon with the possibility of a future war of a similar kind, and to try to ensure that the United States would be better prepared for a recurrence of such war, despite a military tradition of looking mainly to the defense of the continental homeland.” [Weigley (1984), p. 395]. In this section, we consider only the military’s post-WWI force structure proposals. It is important to keep in mind that many civilians perceived the threats to the United States differently as they felt WWI was “the war to end all wars.” 161 Millis (1956), p. 241 162 Millis argues that March’s proposal was “a good try; it was also hopeless, in the atmosphere of 1920.” [Millis (1956), p. 241]

-319- A Historical Analysis of Cadre the National Guard be the nation’s primary wartime expansion force. 163 Weigley argues that “Congress nearly despaired of getting a useful military bill, since the Army clung stubbornly to Emory Upton while the legislators would not yield to him.” 164 Colonel John McAuley Palmer, the man behind the Stimson report, provided a competing proposal, more palatable to Congress. Palmer argued against the War Department proposal and instead “suggested a much smaller Regular Army, whose formations would not be skeletonized but essentially complete.” 165 Palmer proposed the Swiss citizen Army as a model “with its professional soldiers mainly the trainers of citizen formations.” 166 Palmer argued that “companies, regiments, and divisions should be organized in peace to prepare for war, but they should be mostly citizen-army formations, not Regular Army units in which citizen soldiers would be absorbed and submerged.” 167 Palmer’s proposal impressed the House Committee so much that it asked the War Department to release him to help write a new military law. 168 The new law became the National Defense Act of June 4, 1920. 5.1.2—The National Defense Act of 1920 The National Defense Act (NDA) of 1920 called for a fully manned Regular Army of 280,000 men that would be ready to deploy quickly. 169 Behind this, “the principal military ____________ 163 The National Guard lobby had a significant impact on Congressional reaction to this cadre proposal. Jacobs argues: “Guardsmen were convinced that the Regular Army, in the pattern of Calhoun and Upton, sought to oust the National Guard from the place it had earned in the military establishment.” [Jacobs (1994), p. 42] 164 Weigley (1984), p. 397 165 Weigley (1984), p. 397 166 Weigley (1984), p. 398 167 Weigley (1984), p. 398 168 Palmer (1941), p. 160 169 United States Congress (1920). This was equivalent to 265 troops per 100,000 residents. [U.S. Census Bureau (1975), p. 1140-1143 and U.S. Census Bureau (2002), p. A-1]

-319- A Historical Analysis of <strong>Cadre</strong><br />

the National Guard be the nation’s primary wartime expansion force. 163 Weigley argues that<br />

“Congress nearly despaired of getting a useful military bill, since the <strong>Army</strong> clung stubbornly<br />

to Emory Upton while the legislators would not yield to him.” 164<br />

Colonel John McAuley Palmer, the man behind the Stimson report, provided a<br />

competing proposal, more palatable to Congress. Palmer argued against the War<br />

Department proposal and instead “suggested a much smaller Regular <strong>Army</strong>, whose<br />

formations would not be skeletonized but essentially complete.” 165 Palmer proposed the<br />

Swiss citizen <strong>Army</strong> as a model “with its professional soldiers mainly the trainers of citizen<br />

formations.” 166 Palmer argued that “companies, regiments, and divisions should be<br />

organized in peace to prepare for war, but they should be mostly citizen-army formations,<br />

not Regular <strong>Army</strong> units in which citizen soldiers would be absorbed and submerged.” 167<br />

Palmer’s proposal impressed the House Committee so much that it asked the War<br />

Department to release him to help write a new military law. 168 The new law became the<br />

National Defense Act of June 4, 1920.<br />

5.1.2—The National Defense Act of 1920<br />

The National Defense Act (NDA) of 1920 called for a fully manned Regular <strong>Army</strong><br />

of 280,000 men that would be ready to deploy quickly. 169 Behind this, “the principal military<br />

____________<br />

163 The National Guard lobby had a significant impact on Congressional reaction to this cadre proposal. Jacobs<br />

argues: “Guardsmen were convinced that the Regular <strong>Army</strong>, in the pattern of Calhoun and Upton, sought to<br />

oust the National Guard from the place it had earned in the military establishment.” [Jacobs (1994), p. 42]<br />

164 Weigley (1984), p. 397<br />

165 Weigley (1984), p. 397<br />

166 Weigley (1984), p. 398<br />

167 Weigley (1984), p. 398<br />

168 Palmer (1941), p. 160<br />

169 United States Congress (1920). This was equivalent to 265 troops per 100,000 residents. [U.S. Census<br />

Bureau (1975), p. 1140-1143 and U.S. Census Bureau (2002), p. A-1]

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