Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation

-318- A Historical Analysis of Cadre
grown to 3,685,458 officers and men, more than 17 times larger than the army that existed
before the war. 159 After the war, army planners began considering how to prepare for future
wars of similar size. 160 Initially, the Army proposed a cadre force similar to that proposed by
Emory Upton. Congress opposed this plan because it did not include the National Guard.
Instead, Congress modified a proposal written by John McAuley Palmer. Palmer’s proposal
became the National Defense Act (NDA) of 1920. The NDA of 1920 rejected the Uptonian
cadre force but created a new type force, which would become, without explicitly planning
for it, a cadre force. This cadre force would be different from those proposed in the past, as
it existed alongside, not in replacement of, the National Guard.
5.1.1—The Post-War Debate
Following the end of World War I, the War Department recommended a peacetime
cadre army. Chief of Staff Peyton March proposed a permanent Regular Army of 500,000
men “skeletonized to about 50 per cent of its strength … with a system of universal military
training which will ensure an adequate reserve.” 161 This proposal was unacceptable to
Congress. 162 Congress was frustrated by the lack of a plan that considered its desire to have
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159 Kreidberg and Henry (1955), p. 246. In relative terms, the size of the army grew from 210 troops per
100,000 residents to 3593 troops per 100,000 residents. [U.S. Census Bureau (1975), p. 1140-1143 and U.S.
Census Bureau (2002), p. A-1]
160 After WWI there was significant public disagreement over national defense policy. Some argued for a return
to isolationism while others argued for a larger or more rapidly expandable military. The War Department
focused on planning total mobilization [Kreidberg and Henry (1956), p. 382]. Weigley argues that: “the Army’s
leaders had to reckon with the possibility of a future war of a similar kind, and to try to ensure that the United
States would be better prepared for a recurrence of such war, despite a military tradition of looking mainly to
the defense of the continental homeland.” [Weigley (1984), p. 395]. In this section, we consider only the
military’s post-WWI force structure proposals. It is important to keep in mind that many civilians perceived the
threats to the United States differently as they felt WWI was “the war to end all wars.”
161 Millis (1956), p. 241
162 Millis argues that March’s proposal was “a good try; it was also hopeless, in the atmosphere of 1920.” [Millis
(1956), p. 241]