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Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation

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-302- A Historical Analysis of <strong>Cadre</strong><br />

opposition to his cadre-like system as Millis writes: “it had become evident, as Root put it,<br />

that the National Guard lobby would be able ‘to defeat any measure’ for a reserve system<br />

‘which did not commend itself to them;’ so the Secretary had to abandon his ideas for<br />

incorporating the Guard into a Federally controlled reserve.” 105 Root compromised in order<br />

to have some of his other reforms adopted by dropping the requirement for a federally<br />

controlled reserve and Congress passed the Dick Act of 1903. 106 This act asserted that the<br />

National Guard (militia) would be the primary expansion force of the U.S. <strong>Army</strong>.<br />

The Dick Act of 1903 created two classes of militia: “the organized militia, to be<br />

known as the National Guard … and the remainder to be known as the Reserve Militia.” 107<br />

The Act specified that the National Guard “was to be organized, trained and equipped<br />

uniformly with the regular <strong>Army</strong>; the Federal government assumed responsibility for<br />

providing weapons and equipment as well as regular <strong>Army</strong> officers as instructors.” 108 This<br />

was the first time that the government had taken responsibility for training and equipping<br />

the militia (henceforth referred to as the National Guard). The Act also required National<br />

Guard units to hold at least twenty-four drills plus a “summer” encampment of not less than<br />

five consecutive days. 109 Weigley argues that “the Dick Act … laid a foundation for<br />

cooperation of a continually improving kind between the Regular <strong>Army</strong> and the only reserve<br />

force that in 1903 was feasible.” 110<br />

detailed reform proposals.” [Weigley (1984), p. 315] Nonetheless, it is hard not to see the components of<br />

Upton’s reform proposals in Root’s recommendations.<br />

105 Millis (1956), p. 177<br />

106 Root’s other major concern was creating a general staff in order to have continuity in war planning.<br />

107 United States Congress (1903)<br />

108 Millis (1956), p. 179<br />

109 Weigley (1984), p. 321<br />

110 Weigley (1984), p. 322

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