Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation

Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation

07.06.2014 Views

-300- A Historical Analysis of Cadre 3.1—THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR The impetus for resurrecting the debate about cadre forces was the Spanish- American War. When the battleship Maine exploded in Havana harbor, there were a total of 28,747 officers and men in the United States Regular Army. 96 This army was not large enough to fight the Spanish who had nearly 80,000 soldiers in Cuba. 97 In response, Congress authorized the president to increase the size of the army by mobilizing the militia in the Volunteer Act of 1898. 98 The Volunteer Act addressed two of the problems with the militia by enlisting militiamen as individuals rather than units so they could be used overseas and by specifying two-year enlistments. However, many of the militia policies criticized by Emory Upton remained in place. The Spanish-American War highlighted two major problems with the militia. First, many militia units refused to “volunteer” for service. This was exemplified by the 7 th Regiment of New York, which refused to “merge its identity in a Federal army run by ‘West Point martinets.’” 99 The second issue was the condition of those militia units that did volunteer. Millis argues that “they were untrained, ill-equipped, sometimes without proper clothing and even without shoes; none had modern weapons and they were wretchedly deficient in the simplest skills of military life” and equally important “their officers were seldom competent.” 100 Only two regiments from the militia ever saw significant action in the ____________ 96 This was equivalent to 39 troops on active duty per 100,000 residents. This was significantly lower than the average peacetime size of the army during the 19 th century (64 troops per 100,000 residents). [U.S. Census Bureau (1975), p. 1140-1143 and U.S. Census Bureau (2002), p. A-1] 97 Weigley (1984), p. 295 98 United States Congress (1898) 99 Millis (1956), p. 174 100 Millis (1956), p. 174

-301- A Historical Analysis of Cadre Spanish-American War, which prevented a full analysis of their effectiveness. 101 Still, the main lesson from the Spanish-American War was that the militia was not an effective fighting force. Millis argues that : “it was obvious that it would have taken a long time to make an effective force out of the National Guard units which turned out in 1898; it was even more obvious that the whole Army system called for reform.” 102 The Spanish- American War served as the impetus for this reform, which began with the Dick Act of 1903. 3.2—ELIHU ROOT AND THE DICK ACT The experience of the Spanish-American War renewed the debate about the proper peacetime establishment of the U.S. Army. Emory Upton’s cadre proposal was resurrected in this debate. The first proponent of a cadre force was Secretary of War Elihu Root. Root was a lawyer with little knowledge of military affairs upon his appointment but he “attempted a conscientious study of foreign military organization and American reform proposals.” 103 In his readings, Root came across Upton’s manuscript: The Military Policy of the United States. Root was so impressed with Upton’s manuscript that he had it published at the expense of the War Department. Based on his study of military policy, Root proposed a number of significant reforms. One of these reforms was a federally controlled reserve that would be used to fill out an Uptonian cadre force in wartime. 104 Root faced intense ____________ 101 Weigley writes about the relative effectiveness of the militia: “The Uptonians cited the conduct of several other volunteer regiments as further proof of the inferiority of citizen soldiers, especially in regiments drawn from the state militia.” [Weigley (1984), p. 306] 102 Millis (1956), p. 174 103 Weigley (1984), p. 315 104 Ambrose (1964), p. 155. However, Weigley argues that “Root was too much the civilian and had too much common sense to swallow Upton whole …. It was less Upton’s general theme that Root praised than his more

-301- A Historical Analysis of <strong>Cadre</strong><br />

Spanish-American War, which prevented a full analysis of their effectiveness. 101 Still, the<br />

main lesson from the Spanish-American War was that the militia was not an effective<br />

fighting force. Millis argues that : “it was obvious that it would have taken a long time to<br />

make an effective force out of the National Guard units which turned out in 1898; it was<br />

even more obvious that the whole <strong>Army</strong> system called for reform.” 102 The Spanish-<br />

American War served as the impetus for this reform, which began with the Dick Act of<br />

1903.<br />

3.2—ELIHU ROOT AND THE DICK ACT<br />

The experience of the Spanish-American War renewed the debate about the proper<br />

peacetime establishment of the U.S. <strong>Army</strong>. Emory Upton’s cadre proposal was resurrected<br />

in this debate. The first proponent of a cadre force was Secretary of War Elihu Root. Root<br />

was a lawyer with little knowledge of military affairs upon his appointment but he<br />

“attempted a conscientious study of foreign military organization and American reform<br />

proposals.” 103 In his readings, Root came across Upton’s manuscript: The Military Policy of the<br />

United States. Root was so impressed with Upton’s manuscript that he had it published at the<br />

expense of the War Department. Based on his study of military policy, Root proposed a<br />

number of significant reforms. One of these reforms was a federally controlled reserve that<br />

would be used to fill out an Uptonian cadre force in wartime. 104 Root faced intense<br />

____________<br />

101 Weigley writes about the relative effectiveness of the militia: “The Uptonians cited the conduct of several<br />

other volunteer regiments as further proof of the inferiority of citizen soldiers, especially in regiments drawn<br />

from the state militia.” [Weigley (1984), p. 306]<br />

102 Millis (1956), p. 174<br />

103 Weigley (1984), p. 315<br />

104 Ambrose (1964), p. 155. However, Weigley argues that “Root was too much the civilian and had too much<br />

common sense to swallow Upton whole …. It was less Upton’s general theme that Root praised than his more

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