Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation

-299- A Historical Analysis of Cadre
3. A STRONGER MILITA
Unlike earlier nineteenth century wars, the Spanish-American War served as an
impetus for significant reform. The experiences of the Spanish American War led to a
change in both the perceived threat and the perceived readiness of the reserves. The Army
perceived a more imminent threat because the Spanish-American War led many to
reconsider the protection provided by geographic isolation. The poor performance of the
reserves in the Spanish-American War also led many to question their readiness. Both of
these changes led some military professionals to propose “Uptonian” cadre forces. Secretary
of War Elihu Root first tried to convince Congress to accept a cadre force in 1903. Congress
rejected his proposal and instead passed legislation to remedy the problems with the militia.
In 1910, Army Chief of Staff Leonard Wood tried to resurrect Upton’s cadre proposal.
However, Wood was unable to justify such a force when there appeared to be no imminent
threat.
Recognizing the failures of the militia, but unwilling to accept a cadre force, some
military professionals and Congressmen responded to cadre proposals with plans to
strengthen the militia. In 1912, Secretary of War Henry Stimson published a report that
emphasized that the militia would be the nation’s primary fighting force. This marked the
first time that anyone from the defense establishment outwardly rejected the cadre idea.
Affirming this policy, Congress passed the Volunteer Act of 1914 and the National Defense
Act of 1916. Both of these acts strengthened the militia. This legislation addressed each of
the concerns raised by cadre proponents that were discussed in Section 2.1.4. This
invalidated many of the arguments for a cadre force made by Calhoun and Upton.