Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation

-289- A Historical Analysis of Cadre
military and his personal ambitions. 61 However biased his views, Upton’s observations from
the war were real and shared by other historians. 62 Ambrose wrote that after the Civil War,
Upton “could never forget what he had seen in the Civil War—volunteers refusing to fight
because their contracts had been violated; professional soldiers pushed aside for political
favorites; state governors withholding promotions from deserving men; incompetents, both
professional and amateurs, in command of army corps; militiamen running from the banks
of Bull Run. The Civil War, the great experience in his life, taught Upton that the military
policy of the United States needed improvement.” 63 Upton would find his solution to these
problems on a tour of the world’s armies.
2.3.2—Lessons from The Armies of Asia and Europe
On June 23, 1875, Emory Upton received orders to “travel through Asia and
Europe, reporting on all the armies he observed.” 64 When he returned in 1878, Upton
published his observations in The Armies of Asia and Europe. 65 The majority of his report
focused on describing foreign armies. However, Upton used the final fifty pages to provide
his recommendations for the structure of the United States Army. Upton begins his report
by saying “until we change our present inexpansive organization, which, with few
modifications comes down to us from the Revolution, and devote more attention to military
____________
61 Speaking of Upton, Ambrose wrote: “Nearly every one of his reforms, if adopted, would have an immediate
beneficial effect upon him … But, as he had done before and would again, Upton convinced himself that his
motives were for the good of the army.” [Ambrose (1964), p. 105]
62 Weigley writes: “Citizen soldiers as usual were loath to pay unquestioning obedience to officers who had
recently been their neighbors and whose advantages in soldierly knowledge were at best something culled from
a book.” [Weigley (1984), p. 231] In summarizing the lessons from the Civil War Kreidberg and Henry write:
“The Militia as organized could not provide a reservoir of military manpower…. The officers and enlisted men
of the Regular Army … must be used as the cadre for the wartime Army.” [Kreidberg and Henry (1955), p.
139]
63 Ambrose (1964), p. 52
64 Ambrose (1964), p. 87
65 Upton (1878)