Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation
Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation
-288- A Historical Analysis of Cadre Even though Calhoun’s plan was rejected, cadre proposals spurred by a lack of faith in the militia did not disappear. The next major cadre proponent was Civil War veteran Emory Upton. 2.3—UPTON’S CADRE ARMY Emory Upton is considered the founder of the cadre army. Although he was not the first to think of the idea, he was the first to make a strong argument for its place in United States military policy. Upton’s cadre proposal had enormous influence on future military policy and it was the subject of debate for many years. 2.3.1—Upton’s Civil War Experiences Upton graduated from the Military Academy at West Point in June 1861 and immediately entered the Civil War. Upton emerged from the Civil War as a successful young officer achieving the rank of brevet major general. 57 Upton’s experiences in the Civil War were his first indication that it might be unwise to depend on the militia. After the war, Upton wrote that “the army of which he was a part ‘presented to the world the spectacle of a great nation nearly destitute of military force’”. 58 Upton went on to say that “the militia was ‘so destitute … of instruction and training that … they did not merit the name of a military force.” 59 Upton’s most famous claim was that “20,000 regular troops at Bull Run would have routed the insurgents, settled the question of military resistance and relieved us from the pain and expense of four years of war.” 60 In his biography of Upton, Stephen Ambrose argues that many of these views were biased by Upton’s strong allegiance to a professional ____________ 57 Weigley (1984), p. 275 58 Ambrose (1964), p.17 59 Ambrose (1964), p. 17 60 Millis (1956), p. 117, emphasis added.
-289- A Historical Analysis of Cadre military and his personal ambitions. 61 However biased his views, Upton’s observations from the war were real and shared by other historians. 62 Ambrose wrote that after the Civil War, Upton “could never forget what he had seen in the Civil War—volunteers refusing to fight because their contracts had been violated; professional soldiers pushed aside for political favorites; state governors withholding promotions from deserving men; incompetents, both professional and amateurs, in command of army corps; militiamen running from the banks of Bull Run. The Civil War, the great experience in his life, taught Upton that the military policy of the United States needed improvement.” 63 Upton would find his solution to these problems on a tour of the world’s armies. 2.3.2—Lessons from The Armies of Asia and Europe On June 23, 1875, Emory Upton received orders to “travel through Asia and Europe, reporting on all the armies he observed.” 64 When he returned in 1878, Upton published his observations in The Armies of Asia and Europe. 65 The majority of his report focused on describing foreign armies. However, Upton used the final fifty pages to provide his recommendations for the structure of the United States Army. Upton begins his report by saying “until we change our present inexpansive organization, which, with few modifications comes down to us from the Revolution, and devote more attention to military ____________ 61 Speaking of Upton, Ambrose wrote: “Nearly every one of his reforms, if adopted, would have an immediate beneficial effect upon him … But, as he had done before and would again, Upton convinced himself that his motives were for the good of the army.” [Ambrose (1964), p. 105] 62 Weigley writes: “Citizen soldiers as usual were loath to pay unquestioning obedience to officers who had recently been their neighbors and whose advantages in soldierly knowledge were at best something culled from a book.” [Weigley (1984), p. 231] In summarizing the lessons from the Civil War Kreidberg and Henry write: “The Militia as organized could not provide a reservoir of military manpower…. The officers and enlisted men of the Regular Army … must be used as the cadre for the wartime Army.” [Kreidberg and Henry (1955), p. 139] 63 Ambrose (1964), p. 52 64 Ambrose (1964), p. 87 65 Upton (1878)
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-288- A Historical Analysis of <strong>Cadre</strong><br />
Even though Calhoun’s plan was rejected, cadre proposals spurred by a lack of faith in the<br />
militia did not disappear. The next major cadre proponent was Civil War veteran Emory<br />
Upton.<br />
2.3—UPTON’S CADRE ARMY<br />
Emory Upton is considered the founder of the cadre army. Although he was not the<br />
first to think of the idea, he was the first to make a strong argument for its place in United<br />
States military policy. Upton’s cadre proposal had enormous influence on future military<br />
policy and it was the subject of debate for many years.<br />
2.3.1—Upton’s Civil War Experiences<br />
Upton graduated from the Military Academy at West Point in June 1861 and<br />
immediately entered the Civil War. Upton emerged from the Civil War as a successful young<br />
officer achieving the rank of brevet major general. 57 Upton’s experiences in the Civil War<br />
were his first indication that it might be unwise to depend on the militia. After the war,<br />
Upton wrote that “the army of which he was a part ‘presented to the world the spectacle of a<br />
great nation nearly destitute of military force’”. 58 Upton went on to say that “the militia was<br />
‘so destitute … of instruction and training that … they did not merit the name of a military<br />
force.” 59 Upton’s most famous claim was that “20,000 regular troops at Bull Run would have<br />
routed the insurgents, settled the question of military resistance and relieved us from the<br />
pain and expense of four years of war.” 60 In his biography of Upton, Stephen Ambrose<br />
argues that many of these views were biased by Upton’s strong allegiance to a professional<br />
____________<br />
57 Weigley (1984), p. 275<br />
58 Ambrose (1964), p.17<br />
59 Ambrose (1964), p. 17<br />
60 Millis (1956), p. 117, emphasis added.