Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation

-287- A Historical Analysis of Cadre
leadership while cutting the enlisted strength in half. Calhoun argued that volunteers could
be recruited to fill out the “cadre” units in time of war. 51
Calhoun claimed his plan would “enable the government, at the commencement of
hostilities, to obtain a regular force, adequate to the emergencies of the country, properly
organized and prepared for actual service.” 52 This plan was based on the premise that the
existing state militias were not an effective fighting force as Calhoun explained:
“I am aware that the militia is considered, and in many respects justly, as the great
national force; but to render them effective, every experienced officer must
acknowledge, that they require the aid of regular troops … they may be safely relied
on to garrison our forts, and to act in the field as light troops … to rely upon them
beyond this, to suppose our militia capable of meeting in the open field the regular
troops of Europe, would be to resist the most obvious truth, and the whole of our
experience as a nation.”
- Secretary of War John C. Calhoun, 1820 53
Congress rejected Calhoun’s proposal. Instead, Congress reduced the size of the
Army to 6,000 men with proportional cuts made in both officer and enlisted personnel. 54
Weigley argues that Congress opposed Calhoun’s plan mainly due to its relation to the “new
awakening of nationalism” which “emphasized the distinction between citizen and soldier.” 55
Congress remained skeptical of professional armies based on experiences in England.
Additionally, the militia had significant lobbying power in Congress because they were well
organized, distributed in all Congressional districts, and tied into the local political system. 56
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51 Millis describes Calhoun’s plan: “Volunteers would largely supply the increments; the national officer cadre
would largely exist; the discipline and training of the regulars would stiffen the recruits and soon be imparted to
them.” [Millis (1956), p. 83]
52 Calhoun (1820), p. 4
53 Calhoun (1820), p. 4
54 Weigley (1984), p. 142
55 Weigley (1984), p. 142
56 The National Guard continues to have a strong congressional lobby. In 2008, the National Guard continues
to be well organized and distributed among Congressional districts though they are less tied into local politics.
Great care should be taken to consider the National Guard’s reaction to any cadre proposal since these
proposals have historically attacked its effectiveness.