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-286- A Historical Analysis of Cadre border police.” 46 To balance the requests of both Congress and military professions, Calhoun proposed an ‘expansible’ Army. 47 Calhoun’s plan called for “reducing the rank and file, without a correspondent reduction of the battalions and regiments.” 48 Calhoun proposed cutting enlisted strength in half while retaining all officers as shown in Figure 2.1. 49 Figure 2.1—Calhoun’s Expansible Army Proposal 50 Calhoun proposed reducing the number of enlisted personnel in an infantry regiment from 7,065 to 3,366 (a reduction of 52 percent) while retaining all 297 infantry officers. His proposal also cut the number of enlisted personnel in artillery companies from 4,971 to 3,025 (a reduction of 39 percent) while slightly reducing the number of artillery officers from 275 to 247 (ten percent). Overall, Calhoun’s proposal maintained force structure and ____________ 46 Millis (1956), p. 82 47 Calhoun’s Report of the Secretary of War of a Plan for the Reduction of the Army of the United States does not explicitly use the word “expansible” but many historical references to this plan use this term due to the use of this term by Emory Upton in The Armies of Asia and Europe. For the purposes of this paper expansible is synonymous with cadre. 48 Calhoun (1820), p. 9 49 See Appendix B for a more detailed breakout of Calhoun’s proposal. 50 Calhoun (1820), Table E
-287- A Historical Analysis of Cadre leadership while cutting the enlisted strength in half. Calhoun argued that volunteers could be recruited to fill out the “cadre” units in time of war. 51 Calhoun claimed his plan would “enable the government, at the commencement of hostilities, to obtain a regular force, adequate to the emergencies of the country, properly organized and prepared for actual service.” 52 This plan was based on the premise that the existing state militias were not an effective fighting force as Calhoun explained: “I am aware that the militia is considered, and in many respects justly, as the great national force; but to render them effective, every experienced officer must acknowledge, that they require the aid of regular troops … they may be safely relied on to garrison our forts, and to act in the field as light troops … to rely upon them beyond this, to suppose our militia capable of meeting in the open field the regular troops of Europe, would be to resist the most obvious truth, and the whole of our experience as a nation.” - Secretary of War John C. Calhoun, 1820 53 Congress rejected Calhoun’s proposal. Instead, Congress reduced the size of the Army to 6,000 men with proportional cuts made in both officer and enlisted personnel. 54 Weigley argues that Congress opposed Calhoun’s plan mainly due to its relation to the “new awakening of nationalism” which “emphasized the distinction between citizen and soldier.” 55 Congress remained skeptical of professional armies based on experiences in England. Additionally, the militia had significant lobbying power in Congress because they were well organized, distributed in all Congressional districts, and tied into the local political system. 56 ____________ 51 Millis describes Calhoun’s plan: “Volunteers would largely supply the increments; the national officer cadre would largely exist; the discipline and training of the regulars would stiffen the recruits and soon be imparted to them.” [Millis (1956), p. 83] 52 Calhoun (1820), p. 4 53 Calhoun (1820), p. 4 54 Weigley (1984), p. 142 55 Weigley (1984), p. 142 56 The National Guard continues to have a strong congressional lobby. In 2008, the National Guard continues to be well organized and distributed among Congressional districts though they are less tied into local politics. Great care should be taken to consider the National Guard’s reaction to any cadre proposal since these proposals have historically attacked its effectiveness.
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THE ARTS CHILD POLICY CIVIL JUSTICE
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Considering a Cadre Augmented Army
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- iii - PREFACE This dissertation e
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- vii - SUMMARY This dissertation c
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- ix - the similarities and differe
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- xiii - ACRONYMS Symbol AC AIT ARF
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-1- Introduction Introduction This
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-3- Introduction ability to rotate
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-5- Introduction In a force designe
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-7- Introduction increasing militar
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-9- Introduction peacetime have bee
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-11- Introduction forces. This is i
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-14- A Budgetary Analysis of Cadre
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-137- An Operational Analysis of Ca
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-377- Conclusion Conclusion This di
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-379- Bibliography Bibliography Ada
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-381- Bibliography Carter, William
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-383- Bibliography Department of De
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-385- Bibliography Garamone, Jim,
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-387- Bibliography Howze, Hamilton
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-389- Bibliography Michie, Peter Sm
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-391- Bibliography Stewart, Richard
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-393- Bibliography Vick, Alan, Davi
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Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation

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