Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation
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Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation

Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation

rand.org
07.06.2014 Views

-284- A Historical Analysis of Cadre government, they could be sent anywhere in the world. This became more important as the War of 1812 was the first of many engagements in which troops would be deployed outside of the United States. Both of the problems with the militia encountered in the war of 1812 would weigh heavily on the minds of John C. Calhoun and Emory Upton when recommending an appropriate peacetime structure for the army. However, it is worth noting that these problems do not relate directly to the readiness of the militia themselves but to the militia system. Weigley concludes: “the War of 1812 demonstrated no clear superiority of Regular Army formations over those based upon volunteer militia.” 42 However, the restrictions on the ability to use the militia were as important as the readiness of the force. A lack of adequate troops has the same harmful effect as a larger force with degraded capability. The problems brought to the forefront by the War of 1812 would remain key drawbacks to any military policy depending on the militia as the nation’s primary war fighting force. 2.1.4—Problems with the Militia We have reviewed the problems with the militia that spurred Calhoun and Upton to propose cadres force to replace the militia. They argued that the militia could not be depended upon due to: • Short enlistments • Unqualified Officers (state appointment of officers) • Lack of training and equipment (training supervised by states, equipment provided by individual militiamen) • Dependence upon state governors to furnish troops ____________ 42 Weigley, p. 131. Weigley refers to historians who try to argue that the War of 1812 demonstrates the superiority of the Regular Army as: “Uptonian historians,” biased by the arguments for a professional force made by Emory Upton.

-285- A Historical Analysis of Cadre • Inability to use the militia outside of the United States All of the above are systemic problems and do not bring into question the effectiveness of individual militiamen. This distinction is important because many would later interpret the arguments of cadre proponents to be personal attacks on the militia. 2.2—CALHOUN’S EXPANSIBLE ARMY “At the commencement of hostilities, there should be nothing either to new model or to create. The only difference, consequently, between the peace and the war formation of the army, ought to be in the increased magnitude of the latter; and the only change in passing from the former to the latter, should consist in give to it the augmentation which will then be necessary.” - Secretary of War John C. Calhoun, 1820 43 Secretary of War John C. Calhoun first introduced the idea of a cadre force to U.S. military policy in 1820. On May 11, 1820, Calhoun was directed by Congress to prepare a plan to reduce the size of the Regular Army from 12,000 to 6,000 personnel. 44 Weigley argues that there were two reasons for this request: (1) Congress was frustrated with General Andrew Jackson’s excursions into Spanish Florida and wanted to restrain military adventurism, and (2) some Congressmen wanted to “depreciate the Presidential stock of both General Jackson and War Secretary Calhoun.” 45 Millis argues that military professionals opposed this reduction because the “Seminole War rather clearly indicated that a regular Army of even 10,000 men was too small for the normal requirements of Indian warfare and ____________ 43 Calhoun (1820), p. 5 44 Weigley (1984), p. 140. In relative terms, this was a reduction from 125 troops on active duty per 100,000 residents to 62 troops per 100,000 residents (close to the average relative peacetime size of the army during the 19 th century of 64 troops per 100,000 residents). [U.S. Census Bureau (1975), p. 1140-1143 and U.S. Census Bureau (2002), p. A-1] 45 Weigley (1984), p. 140

-285- A Historical Analysis of <strong>Cadre</strong><br />

• Inability to use the militia outside of the United States<br />

All of the above are systemic problems and do not bring into question the<br />

effectiveness of individual militiamen. This distinction is important because many would<br />

later interpret the arguments of cadre proponents to be personal attacks on the militia.<br />

2.2—CALHOUN’S EXPANSIBLE ARMY<br />

“At the commencement of hostilities, there should be nothing either to new model<br />

or to create. The only difference, consequently, between the peace and the war<br />

formation of the army, ought to be in the increased magnitude of the latter; and the<br />

only change in passing from the former to the latter, should consist in give to it the<br />

augmentation which will then be necessary.”<br />

- Secretary of War John C. Calhoun, 1820 43<br />

Secretary of War John C. Calhoun first introduced the idea of a cadre force to U.S.<br />

military policy in 1820. On May 11, 1820, Calhoun was directed by Congress to prepare a<br />

plan to reduce the size of the Regular <strong>Army</strong> from 12,000 to 6,000 personnel. 44 Weigley<br />

argues that there were two reasons for this request: (1) Congress was frustrated with General<br />

Andrew Jackson’s excursions into Spanish Florida and wanted to restrain military<br />

adventurism, and (2) some Congressmen wanted to “depreciate the Presidential stock of<br />

both General Jackson and War Secretary Calhoun.” 45 Millis argues that military professionals<br />

opposed this reduction because the “Seminole War rather clearly indicated that a regular<br />

<strong>Army</strong> of even 10,000 men was too small for the normal requirements of Indian warfare and<br />

____________<br />

43 Calhoun (1820), p. 5<br />

44 Weigley (1984), p. 140. In relative terms, this was a reduction from 125 troops on active duty per 100,000<br />

residents to 62 troops per 100,000 residents (close to the average relative peacetime size of the army during the<br />

19 th century of 64 troops per 100,000 residents). [U.S. Census Bureau (1975), p. 1140-1143 and U.S. Census<br />

Bureau (2002), p. A-1]<br />

45 Weigley (1984), p. 140

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