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Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation

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-279- A Historical Analysis of <strong>Cadre</strong><br />

sponsorship for the first time. At that time, there were about 15,000 colonists ready to fight<br />

in Boston. 16 Because most people expected that the armed uprising would force Britain to<br />

settle the grievances, the colonists were only enlisted through December of 1775. 17 Due to<br />

these short enlistments, when the conflict dragged on into December, “(George)<br />

Washington had to disband one army and create another in the presence of the enemy.” 18<br />

This was the first of many times that General George Washington was forced to replace part<br />

of his army in the midst of combat due to short enlistments. 19 These experiences frustrated<br />

Washington who wrote that only a professional, regular army 20 would serve the wartime<br />

needs of the United States. Washington wrote, “regular troops alone are equal to the<br />

exigencies of modern war, as well for defence as for offence … No militia will ever acquire<br />

the habits necessary to resist a regular force.” 21 <strong>Cadre</strong> proponents would emphasize<br />

Washington’s frustration with the militia in the nineteenth century. 22 However, critics of<br />

____________<br />

16 Millis (1956), p. 29<br />

17 Weigley (1984), p. 34. Government officials understood that longer enlistments were preferred but did not<br />

think that they could be practically achieved. “John Adams estimated that in Massachusetts not over a regiment<br />

‘… of the meanest, idlest, most intemperate and worthless …’ would have enlisted for the duration.”<br />

[Kreidberg and Henry (1955)] Short enlistments were also a way to minimize costs. Since armies generally<br />

rested in the wintertime in the Revolutionary War (except for the battle of Trenton), the government could<br />

minimize costs by enlisting men for the spring through fall and not incur the cost of maintaining forces over<br />

the winter when they provided no fighting capability. [Palmer (1941)]<br />

18 Weigley (1984), p. 34<br />

19 At the end of 1776 when the enlistments of soldiers who enlisted at the end of 1775: “General Washington<br />

was once more compelled to discharge one army and rebuild another in face of the enemy.” [Millis (1956), p.<br />

31]<br />

20 The Regular <strong>Army</strong> is the equivalent of today’s AC force; it does not include the militia (now the National<br />

Guard).<br />

21 Weigley (1984), p. 74<br />

22 In the Military Policy of the United States, Emory Upton’s twelfth lesson from the Revolutionary War was “that<br />

Regular troops engaged for the war, are the only safe reliance of a government, and are in every point of view<br />

the best and most economical.” [Upton (1904), p. 67] Upton quoted Washington extensively in arguing against<br />

the militia. A famous Washington quote used by Upton spoke of the militia: “They come in … you cannot tell<br />

how; go, you cannot tell when; and act, you cannot tell where; consume your provisions, exhaust your stores<br />

and leave you at last at a critical moment.” [Ambrose (1964), p. 125]

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