Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation

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-272- A Historical Analysis of Cadre Figure 1.2—Historical Size of U.S. Army Relative to Population 9 700 All Peacetime Average Soldiers Per 100,000 Residents 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 1794 1804 1814 1824 1834 1844 1854 1864 1874 1884 1894 1904 1914 1924 1934 1944 1954 1964 1974 1984 1994 2004 From 1794 through 1900, there was very little variation in the relative size of the peacetime army because the Army’s assumption about the threat scenario changed very little. The militia was the primary war fighting force of the United States. Policymakers assumed that the United States would have enough time to train and equip the militia before a war broke out because the U.S. was geographically isolated. Over this time period, the Army averaged 64 soldiers on active duty per 100,000 U.S. residents during peacetime. The first significant change in perceived threat occurred following the Spanish American War of 1898. This coincided with renewed concern about the readiness of the reserves. After the Spanish American War, the Army began to question the premise of relying on geographic isolation to provide sufficient warning time. Additionally, the experience with the reserves in the Spanish American War brought into question their readiness. This ignited a force structure debate that lasted from 1900 through the beginning of World War I. Cadre forces were proposed many times throughout this period. These ____________ 9 Data extracted from: U.S. Census Bureau (1975), U.S. Census Bureau (2002), U.S. Census Bureau (2003), and DMDC (2008). See Appendix A for more detail.
-273- A Historical Analysis of Cadre proposals failed to gain support and the Army responded to the change in perceived threat by increasing the size of the active army. Between 1900 and 1916, the average number of soldiers on active duty per 100,000 residents during peacetime was 92, about 50 percent larger than the size of the peacetime Army during the nineteenth century. The second major change in perceived threat occurred following World War I. Based on its experiences in the First World War, the Army perceived a larger and more imminent threat in the period following the war. In response to this new threat, the Army both increased the number of active duty soldiers and created a cadre force. Between 1917 and 1946, the average number of soldiers on active duty during peacetime per 100,000 residents rose to 170, nearly double the size of the force before World War I. A cadre force, the Organized Reserves, was also created following the First World War. The Organized Reserves were initially envisioned as a non-drilling force of fully manned units. However, a lack of funding led to units that retained officers but no enlisted personnel. The Organized Reserves existed as a cadre force until 1955 when it became part of the Army Reserve. The Organized Reserves were the first and only cadre force that existed during peacetime in the United States. The third significant change in perceived threat occurred after World War II. Following the Second World War, there remained two world superpowers: the United States and the Soviet Union. The U.S. Army perceived the Soviet Union as both a larger and more imminent threat than any it had faced before. The Army expected to deploy all forces to Europe quickly in the event of a Soviet invasion. Many believed that the war would be won or lost in the first few months. Cadre units were no longer useful because they would take years to deploy. The Army focused on building a large force that could deploy within months
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THE ARTS CHILD POLICY CIVIL JUSTICE
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Considering a Cadre Augmented Army
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- iii - PREFACE This dissertation e
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- vii - SUMMARY This dissertation c
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- ix - the similarities and differe
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- xiii - ACRONYMS Symbol AC AIT ARF
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-1- Introduction Introduction This
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-3- Introduction ability to rotate
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-5- Introduction In a force designe
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-7- Introduction increasing militar
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-9- Introduction peacetime have bee
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-11- Introduction forces. This is i
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-14- A Budgetary Analysis of Cadre
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-137- An Operational Analysis of Ca
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-377- Conclusion Conclusion This di
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-379- Bibliography Bibliography Ada
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-381- Bibliography Carter, William
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-383- Bibliography Department of De
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-385- Bibliography Garamone, Jim,
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-387- Bibliography Howze, Hamilton
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-389- Bibliography Michie, Peter Sm
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-391- Bibliography Stewart, Richard
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-393- Bibliography Vick, Alan, Davi
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