Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation

-270- A Historical Analysis of Cadre
future wars is subject to great uncertainty. In addition, it is difficult to estimate the readiness
and cost of existing units because of differing assumptions about cost components and the
use of proxy readiness measures. This estimation becomes even more difficult when the
Army considers forces that do not already exist such as cadre forces. Changes in
assumptions about the perceived threat and readiness of the reserves have served as the
impetus for different cadre proposals over time.
1.2—CHANGES IN PERCEIVED READINESS
Cadre forces have been proposed twice during the history of the U.S. Army due to
concerns about the readiness of the reserves. 4 In the early 19 th century, two prominent
military figures, John C. Calhoun and Emory Upton, questioned whether relying on the
militia as the nation’s primary war fighting force was the most cost-effective alternative.
They argued: (1) that the readiness of the militia was overestimated because they did not
receive adequate training or equipment and (2) that a cadre force 5 would provide more
capability for the same cost. Calhoun and Upton argued that it would cost more to raise the
readiness of the reserves than it would to create a cadre force with the same level of
readiness. 6 They framed their arguments in an either/or fashion, arguing that the United
States should either rely entirely on the militia or eliminate the militia and rely on a cadre
force. There was no discussion of force mix. This either/or presentation was a feature of
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4 For ease of presentation, the instance when cadre forces were proposed due to both a change in the perceived
readiness of the reserves and perceived threat is included in the section on perceived threat.
5 Calhoun and Upton envisioned cadre units as units that retained all officers and no enlisted personnel during
peacetime (there were very few NCOs in nineteenth century Army units) that would be filled out in wartime by
a combination of volunteering and conscription. They proposed that cadre units replace all militia units.
6 Neither Calhoun nor Upton explicitly discussed the cost-effectiveness of militia or cadre forces. However,
their recommendations and logic imply that each believed that cadre units were more cost-effective. This is
discussed in more detail in the following chapters.