Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation

Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation

07.06.2014 Views

-268- A Historical Analysis of Cadre Army as an alternative to active and reserve forces. This paper reviews the history of the cadre idea. Cadre proposals have emerged for two main reasons. Either there was a change in the perceived readiness of reserve forces or there was a change in the perceived threat. Cadre units have been proposed twice at times when the readiness of the reserves was questioned, three times when there was a significant change in the perceived threat, and once when there was a change in both. This chapter begins by discussing how assumptions about perceived readiness and threat affect force structure decisions. It then outlines instances when either a change in the perceived readiness of the reserves or the perceived threat has served as the impetus for cadre proposals. The following chapters describe these instances in chronological order. 1.1—THE FORCE STRUCTURE PROBLEM Although many of the assumptions underlying force structure decisions have changed over time, the basic tradeoffs remain the same. Each year, the Army faces a budget constraint. The Army must choose how to allocate funds among a number of competing priorities. For the purposes of this paper, we focus on spending tradeoffs between different types of combat units and ignore other funding priorities such as modernization. For a given budget, there are a myriad of force structures that the Army can choose. The Army must decide which types of forces to maintain, and how many of each type to maintain. These decisions are made based on two important assumptions: (1) the characteristics of the forces that are (or could be) available and (2) the perceived threat.

-269- A Historical Analysis of Cadre From an economic point of view, there are two important characteristics of a force to consider when making a force structure decision: cost and readiness. As discussed in the introduction to this dissertation, there is a direct trade-off between these two measures. The Army has traditionally maintained two types of forces: a full-time active army and a part-time reserve. Active forces have a higher level of readiness and higher cost than reserve forces. Once the Army has specified the set of forces from which to choose, it must make an assumption about the threat scenario. This requires specifying how many and how soon forces would be needed in a war. 3 If the Army expects to have months of warning before it would engage an enemy, as it did during the nineteenth century, then it could depend on a force with a low level of readiness. If the Army expects to engage an enemy with little warning, as it did during the Cold War, then it would want a force with a larger fraction of high readiness units. For the same cost, a high readiness force would have fewer units than a low readiness force. Figure 1.1 depicts the key components of a force structure decision. Figure 1.1—Force Structure Decision Process Perceived Threat Perceived Readiness/Cost AC RC Cadre ? Force Force Structure Decision AC RC Cadre ? M M M M If the Army had perfect knowledge of the readiness/cost of all forces and the threat scenario it will face, force structure decisions would be relatively simple. However, this is never the case. The number of units needed and warning time that would be available in ____________ 3 See Vick et al (2002) for a discussion of warning time from threats facing the United States.

-269- A Historical Analysis of <strong>Cadre</strong><br />

From an economic point of view, there are two important characteristics of a force<br />

to consider when making a force structure decision: cost and readiness. As discussed in the<br />

introduction to this dissertation, there is a direct trade-off between these two measures. The<br />

<strong>Army</strong> has traditionally maintained two types of forces: a full-time active army and a part-time<br />

reserve. Active forces have a higher level of readiness and higher cost than reserve forces.<br />

Once the <strong>Army</strong> has specified the set of forces from which to choose, it must make<br />

an assumption about the threat scenario. This requires specifying how many and how soon<br />

forces would be needed in a war. 3 If the <strong>Army</strong> expects to have months of warning before it<br />

would engage an enemy, as it did during the nineteenth century, then it could depend on a<br />

force with a low level of readiness. If the <strong>Army</strong> expects to engage an enemy with little<br />

warning, as it did during the Cold War, then it would want a force with a larger fraction of<br />

high readiness units. For the same cost, a high readiness force would have fewer units than a<br />

low readiness force. Figure 1.1 depicts the key components of a force structure decision.<br />

Figure 1.1—Force Structure Decision Process<br />

Perceived<br />

Threat<br />

Perceived<br />

Readiness/Cost<br />

AC RC <strong>Cadre</strong> ?<br />

Force Force Structure<br />

Decision<br />

AC RC <strong>Cadre</strong> ?<br />

M M M M<br />

If the <strong>Army</strong> had perfect knowledge of the readiness/cost of all forces and the threat<br />

scenario it will face, force structure decisions would be relatively simple. However, this is<br />

never the case. The number of units needed and warning time that would be available in<br />

____________<br />

3 See Vick et al (2002) for a discussion of warning time from threats facing the United States.

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