Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation

-268- A Historical Analysis of Cadre
Army as an alternative to active and reserve forces. This paper reviews the history of the
cadre idea.
Cadre proposals have emerged for two main reasons. Either there was a change in
the perceived readiness of reserve forces or there was a change in the perceived threat. Cadre
units have been proposed twice at times when the readiness of the reserves was questioned,
three times when there was a significant change in the perceived threat, and once when there
was a change in both. This chapter begins by discussing how assumptions about perceived
readiness and threat affect force structure decisions. It then outlines instances when either a
change in the perceived readiness of the reserves or the perceived threat has served as the
impetus for cadre proposals. The following chapters describe these instances in
chronological order.
1.1—THE FORCE STRUCTURE PROBLEM
Although many of the assumptions underlying force structure decisions have
changed over time, the basic tradeoffs remain the same. Each year, the Army faces a budget
constraint. The Army must choose how to allocate funds among a number of competing
priorities. For the purposes of this paper, we focus on spending tradeoffs between different
types of combat units and ignore other funding priorities such as modernization. For a given
budget, there are a myriad of force structures that the Army can choose. The Army must
decide which types of forces to maintain, and how many of each type to maintain. These
decisions are made based on two important assumptions: (1) the characteristics of the forces
that are (or could be) available and (2) the perceived threat.