Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation

-228- An Operational Analysis of Cadre
In our analysis of cadre structures, we found that the cost of retaining cadre leaders
during peacetime ranges from nine (assuming promotion increases and IRR activation) to 56
(all officers and NCOs) percent of an AC unit. As we explored different peacetime
organizations, we found that the peacetime cost could be reduced significantly if cadre
leaders are dual-hatted (foreign, domestic army training) or retained in non-training status
(RC, senior IRR) during peacetime. We found that a senior IRR can reduce the peacetime
cost of a cadre unit to as little as five percent of an AC unit. Equipment strategies also affect
the relative cost of cadre units during peacetime. In our analysis of equipment alternatives,
we found that full equipment sets are the most expensive alternative, but have the lowest
risk. Relying on rotational equipment sets or the industrial base also reduces the relative cost
of a cadre unit, but increases risk. However, the decrease in the annual cost of a cadre unit
from different equipping strategies appears to be small compared to annual personnel and
operations and maintenance costs.
In wartime, cadre units must be activated, filled out, trained, and demobilized. Table
6.2 defines these dimensions and discusses the results of our analyses.
Table 6.2—Wartime Cadre Concerns
Dimension Definition Concerns
Activation The length of time it takes from the ♦ Requires Congressional funding
beginning of a war for cadre units ♦ Congress unlikely to make concessions to
to be mobilized.
allow for cadre mobilization without its
Filling
The source of personnel to fill out
cadre units during wartime.
approval
♦ Increasing end-strength
• Annual increases in end-strength are
double the increases required for 2007
force structure increase. Unlikely to
achieve this in future wars.
♦ Activate IRR
• Enough junior personnel in IRR to fill
out +6 Cadre force in short-term and
to augment recruiting for other forces.