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Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation

Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation

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-221- An Operational Analysis of <strong>Cadre</strong><br />

Dewar et al argue that training capacity could be “greatly increased” in wartime, they argue:<br />

“the training tempo could be increased with the greater use of all training facilities. Class<br />

sizes could grow, hours of use could increase, and the rate of training at current USATCs<br />

(U.S. <strong>Army</strong> Training Centers) and schools could substantially increase. In addition, more<br />

USATCs and schools could be opened quickly, if required.” 151 All of these would come with<br />

additional costs. For FY 2008, the <strong>Army</strong> requested less than $1 million to train additional<br />

personnel as part of the expansion. 152 In wartime, a cadre augmented force could require<br />

similar expenditures. Given the magnitude of the cost, this would have little impact on the<br />

cost savings from a cadre augmented force.<br />

It appears that training capacity is not a great concern for a cadre augmented force.<br />

If additional new recruits can be trained during off-peak times, the existing individual<br />

training system has enough excess capacity to meet the demands of each of the cadre<br />

augmented forces examined in this dissertation. If additional recruits cannot be added in offpeak<br />

times, the <strong>Army</strong> might temporarily expand the training system as it plans to in FY 2008.<br />

Even if the <strong>Army</strong> temporarily expanded the training system, the additional cost would not<br />

exceed the cost of the training infrastructure that would be required to maintain the<br />

equivalent-sized non-cadre force. Therefore, even if additional costs are incurred during<br />

wartime, this does not increase the cost of a cadre augmented force relative to the same sized<br />

regular force.<br />

The relevance of the discussion in this section depends on whether or not cadre<br />

leaders would be assigned the task of training new recruits during wartime. If cadre leaders<br />

____________<br />

151 Dewar et al (2000), p. 45<br />

152 The <strong>Army</strong> requested $2 million to support three separate needs: AC overstrength, personnel support, and<br />

recruiting and retention. The <strong>Army</strong> does not break these out separately, but it seems fair to assume that the AC<br />

overstrength component is less than half of this amount. [Department of the <strong>Army</strong> (2007b), p. 10]

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