Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation
Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation
-6- Introduction post-mobilization training. 15 If we assume one-year deployments for AC forces, replacement forces are first needed at the beginning of year two. At this point, RC units, which require four months of post-mobilization training 16 , can be fully prepared for deployment. RC combat units provide only eight months deployed per mobilization because their one-year mobilizations include the four months of post-mobilization training. This means that new groups of RC units are needed 1.0, 1.6, and 2.3 years after D-day to sustain deployments in years two and three. 17 The AC units deployed in year one (AC-1) are again available for deployment in year four after they have spent two years at home. The RC units deployed in years two and three (R-1, R-2, R-3) are not available for redeployment again until years eight and nine. Therefore, three new groups of reserve units are needed to augment the active force in years five and six (R-4, R-5, R-6). RC units in R-4, R-5, and R-6 have four to five years to prepare to deploy. These units could be maintained at a level of readiness lower than RC units without significantly ____________ 15 Under ARFORGEN, some RC units would be ready to deploy at the beginning of a conflict because 1/6 of the RC force is in the available pool at any given time. The analysis here remains valid even if RC forces are ready to deploy at the beginning of a conflict as demonstrated in the figure below. This figure shows that under ARFORGEN new groups of RC units are still needed 4.00, 4.66, and 5.33 years after D-day and these units could be maintained as cadre units without significantly increasing military risk. 16 Army National Guard infantry units deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan have required, on average, four months of post-mobilization training. Under ARFORGEN, First Army plans to reduce post-mobilization training to one to three months. However, this requires additional pre-mobilization training. In this paper we assume that this training does not occur during peacetime because RC units are not being regularly deployed. Therefore, those RC units deployed in the first years of a war require four months of post-mobilization training. RC units deploying later in the war may require fewer months of post-mobilization training. 17 If the AC were large enough to meet the demand in year’s two and three, RC forces would not be needed at all and the argument made here is not relevant. However, in order for this to be the case, the United States would need to maintain a very large standing army.
-7- Introduction increasing military risk. This might be desirable because there is a direct tradeoff between the readiness of a force and its peacetime cost. III—TRADEOFF BETWEEN READINESS AND COST The higher the readiness of a unit to deploy, the higher the cost of that unit during peacetime. In order to be ready to deploy almost immediately an AC unit costs almost three times as much in peacetime as a RC unit, which is ready to deploy only after four months of post-mobilization training. A new type of unit that would be ready to deploy later would cost even less than an RC unit. Figure IV notionally demonstrates this tradeoff. Figure IV—Cost/Readiness Tradeoff 18 Peacetime Cost Relative to AC 100 AC Forces (100%) 75 50 25 RC Forces (28%) Lower Readiness Force (?) 0 0 10 20 30 40 Months to Deploy Units maintained at lower levels of readiness have lower costs because they either train less intensively and/or retain fewer personnel during peacetime. RC units are less ready to deploy than AC units because they train much less intensively. 19 A new type of unit could be maintained at an even lower level of readiness by training less intensively than the RC and/or retaining fewer personnel during peacetime. ____________ 18 RC peacetime cost estimate from Jaffe (2006). This is consistent with previous estimates. See Appendix A for more detail. 19 RC units train one weekend a month, two weeks a year while AC units train full-time.
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-7- Introduction<br />
increasing military risk. This might be desirable because there is a direct tradeoff between the<br />
readiness of a force and its peacetime cost.<br />
III—TRADEOFF BETWEEN READINESS AND COST<br />
The higher the readiness of a unit to deploy, the higher the cost of that unit during<br />
peacetime. In order to be ready to deploy almost immediately an AC unit costs almost three<br />
times as much in peacetime as a RC unit, which is ready to deploy only after four months of<br />
post-mobilization training. A new type of unit that would be ready to deploy later would cost<br />
even less than an RC unit. Figure IV notionally demonstrates this tradeoff.<br />
Figure IV—Cost/Readiness Tradeoff 18<br />
Peacetime Cost Relative to AC<br />
100 AC Forces (100%)<br />
75<br />
50<br />
25<br />
RC Forces (28%)<br />
Lower Readiness Force (?)<br />
0<br />
0 10 20 30 40<br />
Months to Deploy<br />
Units maintained at lower levels of readiness have lower costs because they either<br />
train less intensively and/or retain fewer personnel during peacetime. RC units are less ready<br />
to deploy than AC units because they train much less intensively. 19 A new type of unit could<br />
be maintained at an even lower level of readiness by training less intensively than the RC<br />
and/or retaining fewer personnel during peacetime.<br />
____________<br />
18 RC peacetime cost estimate from Jaffe (2006). This is consistent with previous estimates. See Appendix A<br />
for more detail.<br />
19 RC units train one weekend a month, two weeks a year while AC units train full-time.
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