Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation
Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation
-210- An Operational Analysis of Cadre about the IRR made in Chapter Two of this paper, there would be 44,000 personnel in grades E-1 through E-4 available for activation in the IRR. 124 This could provide enough individuals to fill out six cadre BCTs in the first two years of cadre mobilization. This is enough to fill out the entire +6 Cadre force without increasing end-strength. 125 However, this would deplete the stock of IRR members and there would be many fewer junior personnel available in the following years. Additionally, IRR personnel are individuals who have signaled their intention to leave the Army and will likely leave when their enlistment period is completed. Therefore, relying on IRR personnel to fill out units will also require setting higher recruiting targets later in the war to replace IRR personnel who separate. However, IRR activation could reduce the cadre mobilization delay to less than 36 months as IRR personnel would not require as much training as new recruits. There is no additional cost to calling members of the IRR. However, there are drawbacks to this action as demonstrated by the IRR call-up in 2004. 126 In order for the IRR to be a viable source of manpower for cadre units in wartime, the Army must change the perception of the IRR. It must be treated as a pool of deployable manpower and the DoD must make this clear to army personnel. There are some indications that the DoD is already moving in this direction. In a 2004 report, the DoD stated its intention to increase the role of the IRR: “Access to the Individual Ready Reserve is being redefined to make IRR members a more viable source of military manpower and to provide greater depth of ____________ 124 This is based on an assumption that only 63 percent of those called to duty show up [Korb (2005)]. In total there are about 70,000 E-1 through E-4 personnel in the Army IRR. 125 The other cadre augmented forces analyzed in the first paper would require recruiting increases in addition to IRR activation. 126 PBS (2004), Napolitano (2007)
-211- An Operational Analysis of Cadre capabilities.” 127 However, there is little indication as of early 2008 that this has been done. In order to create a pool of deployable manpower, the DoD may need to offer incentives such as bonuses or “muster pay” to individual ready reservists. This would reduce the cost savings from a cadre augmented force. Another concern with making the IRR more deployable is that this would lead to an increase in reenlistments in the active army and reduce the size of the IRR. Lawrence Korb described this phenomenon in the Army in 2008: “Others reenlisted because they knew if they got out after five years they would probably have been called back over the next three years by the Individual Ready Reserve. Major General Robert Scales, the former Commandant of the Army War College, has pointed out that eight years has become the new five-year obligation for West Point Graduates.” 128 If making the IRR more deployable leads to a smaller IRR, then there are fewer personnel to fill out cadre units. The DoD must carefully consider such a shift. The final concern with activating IRR personnel is the amount of training IRR personnel would need when activated. 129 However, there is plenty of time, at least 20 months, for individual ready reservists to be retrained before joining their cadre units. In summary, the IRR alone could be used to fill out the six BCT cadre force in the early years. For other cadre forces, IRR activation could be used in combination with increases in end-strength to fill out cadre units in early years. Over the long-term, all cadre forces will require increasing end-strength because additional personnel will be needed to replace those who leave when their IRR obligation is complete. ____________ 127 DoD (2004), p. 28 128 Korb (2008) 129 Bodilly et al (1986)
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-210- An Operational Analysis of <strong>Cadre</strong><br />
about the IRR made in Chapter Two of this paper, there would be 44,000 personnel in<br />
grades E-1 through E-4 available for activation in the IRR. 124 This could provide enough<br />
individuals to fill out six cadre BCTs in the first two years of cadre mobilization. This is<br />
enough to fill out the entire +6 <strong>Cadre</strong> force without increasing end-strength. 125 However, this<br />
would deplete the stock of IRR members and there would be many fewer junior personnel<br />
available in the following years. Additionally, IRR personnel are individuals who have<br />
signaled their intention to leave the <strong>Army</strong> and will likely leave when their enlistment period is<br />
completed. Therefore, relying on IRR personnel to fill out units will also require setting<br />
higher recruiting targets later in the war to replace IRR personnel who separate. However,<br />
IRR activation could reduce the cadre mobilization delay to less than 36 months as IRR<br />
personnel would not require as much training as new recruits.<br />
There is no additional cost to calling members of the IRR. However, there are<br />
drawbacks to this action as demonstrated by the IRR call-up in 2004. 126 In order for the IRR<br />
to be a viable source of manpower for cadre units in wartime, the <strong>Army</strong> must change the<br />
perception of the IRR. It must be treated as a pool of deployable manpower and the DoD<br />
must make this clear to army personnel. There are some indications that the DoD is already<br />
moving in this direction. In a 2004 report, the DoD stated its intention to increase the role<br />
of the IRR: “Access to the Individual Ready Reserve is being redefined to make IRR<br />
members a more viable source of military manpower and to provide greater depth of<br />
____________<br />
124 This is based on an assumption that only 63 percent of those called to duty show up [Korb (2005)]. In total<br />
there are about 70,000 E-1 through E-4 personnel in the <strong>Army</strong> IRR.<br />
125 The other cadre augmented forces analyzed in the first paper would require recruiting increases in addition<br />
to IRR activation.<br />
126 PBS (2004), Napolitano (2007)