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Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation

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-209- An Operational Analysis of <strong>Cadre</strong><br />

concern is that increasing recruiting now may make it harder to recruit in the future as you<br />

enlist the potential recruits of tomorrow, today.<br />

In order for a cadre augmented force to be attractive, one must believe that the<br />

<strong>Army</strong> could achieve twice the 2008 expansion rate in wartime. One might think this could be<br />

achievable in future wars if national support is stronger than for wars in Iraq and<br />

Afghanistan, if expansion was started earlier in the war, or if the unemployment rate was<br />

higher. Even under these favorable conditions, it seems unrealistic to assume that increased<br />

recruiting alone could fill out cadre units at a rate of three BCTs per year. 120 Therefore, we<br />

considered other sources of wartime manpower such as the IRR and maintaining a larger<br />

RC. 121<br />

5.2.3—Activating the Individual Ready Reserve<br />

The IRR is another source of manpower that could be used to fill out cadre units. In<br />

a 1990 report, the Congressional Budget Office proposed that cadre units be filled out<br />

entirely by members of the IRR. 122 At that time, the IRR was much larger than it is in 2007<br />

because the AC was larger and therefore more people were transitioning from active duty<br />

with outstanding military obligations. 123 However, the IRR remains large enough that some<br />

junior personnel could be activated to help fill out cadre units. Under the same assumptions<br />

____________<br />

120 However, Donnelly and Kagan (2008b) propose a ten-year expansion of ground forces at 30,000 personnel<br />

per year. They argue that “a commitment to expansion, with the concomitant understanding that a larger force<br />

is likely to be a less frequently deployed force , might well contribute to eased recruiting, as, even more, might a<br />

call for service on the part of American political leaders of both parties.” [Donnelly and Kagan (2008b), p. 111]<br />

121 While increased recruiting may not be able to fill out a cadre force at a rate of three BCTs per year, it<br />

appears as though it could achieve a rate of one BCT per year (about the size of the 2007 expansion). At a rate<br />

of one BCT per year, only the six and nine BCT expansions would activate all cadre units over the course of a<br />

ten-year war. These forces would still reduce average long-run costs by about $4 billion annually.<br />

122 CBO (1990)<br />

123 In 1990, there were about 700,000 AC personnel in the army compared to about 500,000 as of 2007.<br />

[O’Hanlon (2004)]

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