Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation
Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation
-208- An Operational Analysis of Cadre expansion rate we assumed in Paper I of three BCTs per year would require an expansion rate nearly twice this rate. Additionally, higher recruiting goals would need to be permanent for the duration of a war, as personnel will leave the force and need to be replaced. As of early 2008, the Army has been successful in achieving its higher recruiting targets. 116 However, the Army has had to reduce its quality standards and significantly increase recruiting expenditures to achieve these targets. 117 Quality and cost will also be recruiting issues facing a cadre augmented force. Quality will be a concern because research shows that a reduction in quality of personnel is associated with a decrease in combat skills. 118 If cadre units are not as effective in wartime as AC or RC units, they may not be able to replace them at the same tradeoff ratios assumed in the first paper of this dissertation. This would reduce the cost savings from a cadre augmented force. Cost will be a concern because increasing the number of recruits requires increasing the size of recruiting bonuses, the number of recruiters, and advertising expenditures. 119 If we assume that the supply curve for military personnel is linear then the cost of a cadre augmented force would be the same as that of the equivalent non-cadre force always maintained at wartime size. This would not be true if the supply curve is concave, in which case the cost of increasing and decreasing the size of the force would be larger than that of permanently maintaining the force at the higher wartime level. One last recruiting ____________ 116 DoD (2007d) 117 CBO (2006), p. 6. Spending on enlistment bonuses increased 75 percent from 2000-2005 while spending on recruiters and advertising increased 38 percent and 73 percent over the same time period. [CBO (2006), p. 8-9]. Not all of these increases can be attributed directly to increasing end-strength. Fighting an unpopular war, together with a healthy economy and a declining percentage of the population qualifying for military service, has also spurred the Army to spend more on recruiting. 118 Studies show that recruits who are better educated and have higher scores on aptitude tests are more likely to complete initial training, more likely to stay in the Army, and perform better in the military. [CBO (2006), p. 6] 119 These are listed as the three “most important resources available to the army to influence accession levels” in CBO (2006). [CBO (2006), p. 7]
-209- An Operational Analysis of Cadre concern is that increasing recruiting now may make it harder to recruit in the future as you enlist the potential recruits of tomorrow, today. In order for a cadre augmented force to be attractive, one must believe that the Army could achieve twice the 2008 expansion rate in wartime. One might think this could be achievable in future wars if national support is stronger than for wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, if expansion was started earlier in the war, or if the unemployment rate was higher. Even under these favorable conditions, it seems unrealistic to assume that increased recruiting alone could fill out cadre units at a rate of three BCTs per year. 120 Therefore, we considered other sources of wartime manpower such as the IRR and maintaining a larger RC. 121 5.2.3—Activating the Individual Ready Reserve The IRR is another source of manpower that could be used to fill out cadre units. In a 1990 report, the Congressional Budget Office proposed that cadre units be filled out entirely by members of the IRR. 122 At that time, the IRR was much larger than it is in 2007 because the AC was larger and therefore more people were transitioning from active duty with outstanding military obligations. 123 However, the IRR remains large enough that some junior personnel could be activated to help fill out cadre units. Under the same assumptions ____________ 120 However, Donnelly and Kagan (2008b) propose a ten-year expansion of ground forces at 30,000 personnel per year. They argue that “a commitment to expansion, with the concomitant understanding that a larger force is likely to be a less frequently deployed force , might well contribute to eased recruiting, as, even more, might a call for service on the part of American political leaders of both parties.” [Donnelly and Kagan (2008b), p. 111] 121 While increased recruiting may not be able to fill out a cadre force at a rate of three BCTs per year, it appears as though it could achieve a rate of one BCT per year (about the size of the 2007 expansion). At a rate of one BCT per year, only the six and nine BCT expansions would activate all cadre units over the course of a ten-year war. These forces would still reduce average long-run costs by about $4 billion annually. 122 CBO (1990) 123 In 1990, there were about 700,000 AC personnel in the army compared to about 500,000 as of 2007. [O’Hanlon (2004)]
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-208- An Operational Analysis of <strong>Cadre</strong><br />
expansion rate we assumed in Paper I of three BCTs per year would require an expansion<br />
rate nearly twice this rate. Additionally, higher recruiting goals would need to be permanent<br />
for the duration of a war, as personnel will leave the force and need to be replaced. As of<br />
early 2008, the <strong>Army</strong> has been successful in achieving its higher recruiting targets. 116<br />
However, the <strong>Army</strong> has had to reduce its quality standards and significantly increase<br />
recruiting expenditures to achieve these targets. 117<br />
Quality and cost will also be recruiting issues facing a cadre augmented force. Quality<br />
will be a concern because research shows that a reduction in quality of personnel is<br />
associated with a decrease in combat skills. 118 If cadre units are not as effective in wartime as<br />
AC or RC units, they may not be able to replace them at the same tradeoff ratios assumed in<br />
the first paper of this dissertation. This would reduce the cost savings from a cadre<br />
augmented force. Cost will be a concern because increasing the number of recruits requires<br />
increasing the size of recruiting bonuses, the number of recruiters, and advertising<br />
expenditures. 119 If we assume that the supply curve for military personnel is linear then the<br />
cost of a cadre augmented force would be the same as that of the equivalent non-cadre force<br />
always maintained at wartime size. This would not be true if the supply curve is concave, in<br />
which case the cost of increasing and decreasing the size of the force would be larger than<br />
that of permanently maintaining the force at the higher wartime level. One last recruiting<br />
____________<br />
116 DoD (2007d)<br />
117 CBO (2006), p. 6. Spending on enlistment bonuses increased 75 percent from 2000-2005 while spending on<br />
recruiters and advertising increased 38 percent and 73 percent over the same time period. [CBO (2006), p. 8-9].<br />
Not all of these increases can be attributed directly to increasing end-strength. Fighting an unpopular war,<br />
together with a healthy economy and a declining percentage of the population qualifying for military service,<br />
has also spurred the <strong>Army</strong> to spend more on recruiting.<br />
118 Studies show that recruits who are better educated and have higher scores on aptitude tests are more likely<br />
to complete initial training, more likely to stay in the <strong>Army</strong>, and perform better in the military. [CBO (2006), p.<br />
6]<br />
119 These are listed as the three “most important resources available to the army to influence accession levels”<br />
in CBO (2006). [CBO (2006), p. 7]