Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation
Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation
-206- An Operational Analysis of Cadre 5.2—FILLING OUT CADRE UNITS Once a cadre unit has been activated, the first step in the mobilization phase is filling out cadre units with junior personnel. Previous cadre proposals have either ignored this issue or assumed that volunteering, conscription, or a federal reserve would be used to fill units during wartime. 112 The cadre force proposed in this paper deviates from these previous proposals in that there is enough time to increase end-strength. Since cadre units would not be needed at full-strength until many years after the beginning of a war, it is reasonable to assume that the size of the Active Component (AC) could be increased over the course of several years to fill out cadre units. However, we find that it is unlikely that end-strength increases alone could fill out the cadre forces analyzed in the first paper. Therefore, we consider other alternatives for procuring junior personnel: activating personnel from the IRR and offering bonuses to RC personnel to serve in cadre units. 5.2.1—Requirements The number of junior personnel needed to fill out a cadre augmented force in wartime is determined by the size of the cadre leadership and the rate at which cadre units are ready for deployment. For the analyses in this section, we assume that 43 percent of a cadre unit’s wartime personnel are retained in peacetime. 113 Therefore, each cadre BCT slice requiring 10,833 personnel would need 6,175 junior personnel in wartime. The number of personnel per BCT is calculated by dividing the size of the 2007 end-strength increase ____________ 112 The proposals of Calhoun and Upton discussed in the third paper of this dissertation completely ignored this issue. Other cadre proposals favored a federal reserve filled with citizens subject to universal military training. Cadre proposals of the 1990s assumed that the Individual Ready Reserve would be used to fill out cadre units. See Paper III of this dissertation for more detail. 113 This is the percentage of personnel retained in a cadre unit that retains all officers and NCOs during peacetime (see Chapter Two).
-207- An Operational Analysis of Cadre (65,000) by the number of BCTs (six). This assumes that combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units are also maintained in cadre status and have grade structures similar to a BCT. At a rate of three BCTs per year, an additional 18,525 junior personnel would be needed each year. Table 5.1 shows the annual increase in the number of junior personnel for different cadre unit structures and rates of mobilization. 114 Table 5.1—Wartime Personnel Needed to Fill Out Cadre Units for Differing Cadre Unit Structures and Mobilization Rates Cadre Mobilization Rate All Officers and NCOs Senior Officers and NCOs 1 BCT / year 6,175 8,342 3 BCT / year 18,525 25,025 6 BCT / year 37,050 50,050 5.2.2—Increasing End Strength Since cadre units would have many years to prepare for deployment, it might be possible to fill out cadre units by increasing the end-strength of the AC. Increasing endstrength in wartime is not new to the United States Army. The Army has increased in size for almost every major war including the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2007, the army announced it was increasing its end strength by 65,000 personnel. There are two concerns with increasing end-strength in wartime: feasibility and cost. As of early 2008, the Army planned to add six BCTs over the course of four years. This expansion occurred at a rate of about 9,000 new soldiers per year. 115 The cadre ____________ 114 Here, we consider only two of the five cadre unit structures examined in Chapter Two. We only need to consider these two structures because the number of junior enlisted personnel required is only determined by the cutoff for senior enlisted personnel. All of the cadre unit structures we examined in Chapter Two define senior enlisted personnel as either E-5 or E-6 and above. The fact that some structures do not retain all senior personnel does not affect the need for junior personnel because senior personnel will be procured by either increasing promotion rates or activating senior IRR personnel. 115 Originally the expansion was planned to take five years at a rate of 7,000 additional soldiers per year [DSB (2007), p. 26; Korb and Bergmann (2007), p. 22]. In late 2007, the DoD stated that the expansion could be accomplished over four years [Cloud (2007)], this increases the rate of expansion to 9,000 per year.
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-207- An Operational Analysis of <strong>Cadre</strong><br />
(65,000) by the number of BCTs (six). This assumes that combat support (CS) and combat<br />
service support (CSS) units are also maintained in cadre status and have grade structures<br />
similar to a BCT. At a rate of three BCTs per year, an additional 18,525 junior personnel<br />
would be needed each year. Table 5.1 shows the annual increase in the number of junior<br />
personnel for different cadre unit structures and rates of mobilization. 114<br />
Table 5.1—Wartime Personnel Needed to Fill Out <strong>Cadre</strong> Units for Differing <strong>Cadre</strong><br />
Unit Structures and Mobilization Rates<br />
<strong>Cadre</strong><br />
Mobilization Rate<br />
All Officers and<br />
NCOs<br />
Senior Officers<br />
and NCOs<br />
1 BCT / year 6,175 8,342<br />
3 BCT / year 18,525 25,025<br />
6 BCT / year 37,050 50,050<br />
5.2.2—Increasing End Strength<br />
Since cadre units would have many years to prepare for deployment, it might be<br />
possible to fill out cadre units by increasing the end-strength of the AC. Increasing endstrength<br />
in wartime is not new to the United States <strong>Army</strong>. The <strong>Army</strong> has increased in size<br />
for almost every major war including the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2007, the army<br />
announced it was increasing its end strength by 65,000 personnel. There are two concerns<br />
with increasing end-strength in wartime: feasibility and cost.<br />
As of early 2008, the <strong>Army</strong> planned to add six BCTs over the course of four years.<br />
This expansion occurred at a rate of about 9,000 new soldiers per year. 115 The cadre<br />
____________<br />
114 Here, we consider only two of the five cadre unit structures examined in Chapter Two. We only need to<br />
consider these two structures because the number of junior enlisted personnel required is only determined by<br />
the cutoff for senior enlisted personnel. All of the cadre unit structures we examined in Chapter Two define<br />
senior enlisted personnel as either E-5 or E-6 and above. The fact that some structures do not retain all senior<br />
personnel does not affect the need for junior personnel because senior personnel will be procured by either<br />
increasing promotion rates or activating senior IRR personnel.<br />
115 Originally the expansion was planned to take five years at a rate of 7,000 additional soldiers per year [DSB<br />
(2007), p. 26; Korb and Bergmann (2007), p. 22]. In late 2007, the DoD stated that the expansion could be<br />
accomplished over four years [Cloud (2007)], this increases the rate of expansion to 9,000 per year.