Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation

More documents

Recommendations

Info

-204- An Operational Analysis of <strong>Cadre</strong> alternatives: (1) activation requiring legislative and executive approval and (2) activation without requiring legislative approval. We also consider how we might avoid delays in the activation process through peacetime policy statements. 5.1.1—Activation Requiring Executive and Legislative Approval In order to activate cadre units, recruiting will need to be increased. This requires that the President requests, and the U.S. Congress provides, additional funding. 108 Therefore, without any pre-war cadre legislation, actions must be taken by the President and Congress to activate cadre units. 109 This could delay the activation of cadre units. The increases in recruiting for some of the cadre augmented forces would be significant and would likely be debated extensively by those in the executive branch and by members of Congress. If both branches cannot agree to take action, cadre units that rely on end-strength increases could not be activated. 110 This is a risk of relying upon a cadre augmented force. 5.1.2—Activation without Requiring Legislative Approval One way to remove one of the barriers to cadre activation is to remove the need for legislative approval of end-strength increases for cadre units. To do this, Congress could pass a law during peacetime that allows for temporary increases in army end-strength whenever the President requests them for cadre units. However, it is doubtful that Congress would approve of passing such a measure because it reduces its power. Such a measure would force Congress to give up its prerogative to declare war and its ability to control the ____________ 108 As dictated in the U.S. Constitution: “The Congress shall have the power to … raise and support Armies.” (Article 1, Section 8) 109 Unless funding is requested after the fact as has been the case with the supplemental funding bills for the Global War on Terror which have been used to pay for activated reservists. 110 This would not be the case if cadre units were filled out entirely with personnel from the IRR. However, as shown in the following section, the IRR alone cannot fill out all cadre forces for a sustained period of time.
-205- An Operational Analysis of <strong>Cadre</strong> size of the military. Additionally, the President already has the power to mobilize the RC for a limited amount of time without Congressional approval. Therefore, it is unlikely that Congress will cede further authority. If this option is considered, the law should be written so that end-strength can only be increased upon the president’s declaration of war and that end-strength increases are limited to that required by cadre units. Nonetheless, it still seems very unlikely that Congress would ever agree on such a law. 5.1.3—Delays in Activation There is a concern with activating cadre units that is common to both of the alternatives we just discussed. Given the long lead time required to prepare cadre units for deployment and the inherent uncertainty in force requirements, it may take some time before a decision is made to activate cadre units. This delays the availability of cadre units. In the first paper of this dissertation, we assumed that cadre units would not be activated until after the first year of the war, but it may take longer than this. For this reason, it is advisable to set a policy in peacetime dictating when cadre units should be mobilized. For example, the policy might say that cadre units should be mobilized whenever the requirement for deployed forces surges for one year or longer to a level beyond that which the AC force can handle over the long term when used according to rotation guidance. 111 Making this policy guidance clear in peacetime might make it more likely that cadre units will be mobilized in a timely manner in wartime. However, nothing can guarantee that there will not be a delay in cadre mobilization. This is one of the major risks of relying on a cadre augmented force. The other major risk, the ability to fill out cadre units in wartime, is the topic of the next section. ____________ 111 This is simply policy guidance. Wartime decisions would be made based on force projections. The activation decision should err on the side of caution by activating cadre whenever there is a credible need for them.
Page 1 and 2:
THE ARTS CHILD POLICY CIVIL JUSTICE
Page 3 and 4:
Considering a Cadre Augmented Army
Page 5:
- iii - PREFACE This dissertation e
Page 9 and 10:
- vii - SUMMARY This dissertation c
Page 11:
- ix - the similarities and differe
Page 15 and 16:
- xiii - ACRONYMS Symbol AC AIT ARF
Page 17 and 18:
-1- Introduction Introduction This
Page 19 and 20:
-3- Introduction ability to rotate
Page 21 and 22:
-5- Introduction In a force designe
Page 23 and 24:
-7- Introduction increasing militar
Page 25 and 26:
-9- Introduction peacetime have bee
Page 27:
-11- Introduction forces. This is i
Page 30 and 31:
-14- A Budgetary Analysis of Cadre
Page 32 and 33:
Page 34 and 35:
Page 37 and 38:
Page 39 and 40:
Page 41 and 42:
Page 43 and 44:
Page 45 and 46:
Page 47 and 48:
Page 49 and 50:
Page 51 and 52:
Page 53 and 54:
Page 55 and 56:
Page 57 and 58:
Page 59 and 60:
Page 61 and 62:
Page 63 and 64:
Page 65 and 66:
Page 67 and 68:
Page 69 and 70:
Page 71 and 72:
Page 73 and 74:
Page 75 and 76:
Page 77 and 78:
Page 79 and 80:
Page 81 and 82:
Page 83 and 84:
Page 85 and 86:
Page 87 and 88:
Page 89 and 90:
Page 91 and 92:
Page 93 and 94:
Page 95 and 96:
Page 97 and 98:
Page 99 and 100:
Page 101 and 102:
Page 103 and 104:
Page 105 and 106:
Page 107 and 108:
Page 109 and 110:
Page 111 and 112:
Page 113 and 114:
Page 115 and 116:
Page 117 and 118:
Page 119 and 120:
Page 121 and 122:
Page 123 and 124:
Page 125 and 126:
Page 127 and 128:
Page 129 and 130:
Page 131 and 132:
Page 133 and 134:
Page 135 and 136:
Page 137 and 138:
Page 139 and 140:
Page 141 and 142:
Page 143 and 144:
Page 145 and 146:
Page 147 and 148:
Page 149 and 150:
Page 151 and 152:
Page 153 and 154:
-137- An Operational Analysis of Ca
Page 155 and 156:
Page 157:
Page 161 and 162:
Page 163 and 164:
Page 165 and 166:
Page 167 and 168:
Page 169 and 170: -153- An Operational Analysis of Ca
Page 219: -203- An Operational Analysis of Ca
Page 271 and 272:
Page 273:
Page 276 and 277:
-260- A Historical Analysis of Cadr
Page 278 and 279:
Page 281:
Page 284 and 285:
Page 286 and 287:
Page 288 and 289:
Page 290 and 291:
Page 292 and 293:
Page 294 and 295:
Page 296 and 297:
Page 298 and 299:
Page 300 and 301:
Page 302 and 303:
Page 304 and 305:
Page 306 and 307:
Page 308 and 309:
Page 310 and 311:
Page 312 and 313:
Page 314 and 315:
Page 316 and 317:
Page 318 and 319:
Page 320 and 321:
Page 322 and 323:
Page 324 and 325:
Page 326 and 327:
Page 328 and 329:
Page 330 and 331:
Page 332 and 333:
Page 334 and 335:
Page 336 and 337:
Page 338 and 339:
Page 340 and 341:
Page 342 and 343:
Page 344 and 345:
Page 346 and 347:
Page 348 and 349:
Page 350 and 351:
Page 352 and 353:
Page 354 and 355:
Page 356 and 357:
Page 358 and 359:
Page 360 and 361:
Page 362 and 363:
Page 364 and 365:
Page 366 and 367:
Page 368 and 369:
Page 370 and 371:
Page 372 and 373:
Page 374 and 375:
Page 376 and 377:
Page 378 and 379:
Page 380 and 381:
Page 382 and 383:
Page 384 and 385:
Page 386 and 387:
Page 388 and 389:
Page 390 and 391:
Page 393 and 394:
-377- Conclusion Conclusion This di
Page 395 and 396:
-379- Bibliography Bibliography Ada
Page 397 and 398:
-381- Bibliography Carter, William
Page 399 and 400:
-383- Bibliography Department of De
Page 401 and 402:
-385- Bibliography Garamone, Jim,
Page 403 and 404:
-387- Bibliography Howze, Hamilton
Page 405 and 406:
-389- Bibliography Michie, Peter Sm
Page 407 and 408:
-391- Bibliography Stewart, Richard
Page 409:
-393- Bibliography Vick, Alan, Davi
show all

Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?