Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation

-200- An Operational Analysis of Cadre
production. This is equivalent to providing enough tanks for nine BCTs. However, these
tanks will not be ready until after cadre personnel are ready to deploy since we assumed in
the first paper of this dissertation that it would take two years to fill and train a cadre unit
after activation. Therefore, unless the startup delay could be shortened to less than two
years, the availability of equipment will constrain the deployment of a heavy cadre unit
relying on the industrial base.
The above analysis has focused on equipment for heavy divisions. Equipment for
light forces (infantry/Stryker BCTs) would not be as much of an issue. The startup times for
infantry equipment would likely be significantly shorter. Dewar et al (2000) omit equipment
from their model of light force expansion because they argue that “compared to outfitting a
heavy division, the light division equipment requirement is relatively modest.” 103 They
explain that: “there are three main equipment items besides small arms that a light division
includes in its TOE (Table of Organization and Equipment): trucks, HMMWVs (High
Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle), and artillery, either howitzers or MLRS (Multiple
Launch Rocket System).” 104 The authors looked briefly at the industrial base for trucks and
concluded that “the industrial base for trucks differs from the other five combat system
industrial bases in two important respects: it is “hot” and it is much more “commercial” in
nature.” 105 Therefore, startup times for infantry equipment would likely be much shorter
than two years, enough time to provide equipment to deploying cadre units.
Overall, by relying on private industry, cadre units relying on the industrial base
could not be certain that they would have all the equipment they need when it is time to
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103 Dewar et al (2000), p. 110
104 Dewar et al (2000), p. 110, acronym descriptions added.
105 Dewar et al (2000), p. 110