Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation

-5- Introduction
In a force designed for use with rotation, some units are not needed as quickly as
they were in a force designed for use without rotation. If the DoD adheres to the stated
rotation guidance as of 2007 11 , the analysis below shows that limiting the Army to only
Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) units leads to a force with some
units that are maintained at an unnecessarily high level of readiness. In this analysis, we
assume that the AC force is not large enough to meet the wartime demand for deployed
forces alone. 12 Figure III shows how the AC and RC might meet the requirements of a
notional long war with rotation when force requirements are relatively predictable. 13
Figure III—Meeting a Sustained Surge in Demand for Deployed Forces 14
In this notional war, the demand for deployed forces surges suddenly in year one (on
D-Day). Only AC units can be deployed in year one because RC units cannot deploy without
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11 DoD rotation guidance for Active Component (Reserve Component) units states that for every one year
deployed (mobilized), each unit should spend two (five) years at home which is represented as 1:2 (1:5).
[Schoomaker (2006) and DoD (2007a)]
12 The force structure that exists as of 2008 has about 42 AC and 28 RC combat units. Therefore, any sustained
requirement for deployed forces above 14 AC units (42/3=14) would require the deployment of RC units.
13 This analysis assumes that the demand for deployed forces is relatively predictable. For stabilization and
reconstruction operations this is an appropriate assumption since these types of operations generally require a
substantial commitment of ground forces for a number of years. DoD (2004) states: “the predictability and
long lead time associated with rotational overseas presence allows for substantial planning and preparation of
units” [DoD (2004), p. 24].
14 This notional graph is similar to the one on page six of DSB (2004).