Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation
Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation
-190- An Operational Analysis of Cadre Table 3.2—Cadre Leaders Relative to Total Army Grade Active Army (2008) 81 6 BCT 9 BCT 18 BCT Officers Colonel (O-6) 3,332 0% 1% 1% Lieutenant Colonel (O-5) 8,548 1% 1% 2% Major (O-4) 16,072 2% 2% 5% Captain (O-3) 25,328 3% 5% 10% Lieutenant (O-1, O-2) 15,268 9% 13% 26% NCOs Sergeant Major (E-9) 3,062 3% 4% 9% First / Master Sergeant (E-8) 10,535 3% 5% 9% Sergeant First Class (E-7) 35,861 3% 5% 10% Staff Sergeant (E-6) 56,863 5% 8% 15% Sergeant (E-5) 76,142 8% 12% 23% At most, the largest cadre expansion requires 26 percent of the leaders not assigned to combat units in any grade. Although some of these officers are assigned to non-combat units, the number of leaders needed relative to the number not assigned to a unit is still high. However, to rely on the existing force structure to provide leaders for cadre units in wartime requires assuming that the duties performed by leaders not assigned to units could be ignored in the event of a war. If this were true, then cadre leaders would not need to be retained separately in peacetime and the peacetime cost of a cadre unit would be zero because 100 percent of their cost would be assigned to other duties. However, it is likely that the number of officers/NCOs not assigned to units would decrease if the number of active combat units were reduced. Therefore, reducing the number of AC units under the assumption that there would be enough leaders for cadre units within the existing force structure is not advisable. If some AC units are to be replaced with cadre units, careful consideration must to given to making sure there are a sufficient number of officers/NCOs not assigned to units retained during this process. ____________ 81 Department of the Army (2007a), p. 9 (estimate for September 30, 2008).
-191- An Operational Analysis of Cadre 4. EQUIPPING CADRE UNITS Thus far, we have assumed that cadre units would be equipped similarly to AC units in peacetime by ignoring equipment costs. However, the extended time required to mobilize cadre units allows us to consider a number of alternative ways of reducing the equipment costs of cadre units below that of AC units during peacetime. This would make a cadre augmented force even more attractive than calculated in Paper I. While we do not integrate equipment costs into the analysis performed in Paper I, in this chapter, we consider how different equipping strategies might affect the cost and risk from a cadre augmented force. There are two types of equipment costs: purchase costs and operation and maintenance costs. If cadre units are used to expand the force (+6, +9, +18 BCT forces), then reducing the amount of equipment assigned to cadre units below that of AC units would provide an initial one-time savings in purchase costs and additional yearly savings in operation and maintenance costs. 82 If cadre units are integrated by changing the mix of the current force (CadreMix force), then there would be no one-time savings in purchase cost for cadre units replacing AC units because full equipment sets already exist for these units. 83 Replacing RC units with cadre units could increase purchase costs if cadre units required more equipment in peacetime than RC units. 84 However, this is unlikely, because cadre units take longer to mobilize and would therefore have more time to acquire equipment before deploying. In both cases, cadre units would have lower operations and maintenance ____________ 82 Additional one-time savings in purchase costs would be achieved over the long-term when new equipment sets are needed to replace old ones. 83 Though again, there would be savings over the long-term as equipment is replaced. 84 RC units are generally not provided full equipment sets.
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-191- An Operational Analysis of <strong>Cadre</strong><br />
4. EQUIPPING CADRE UNITS<br />
Thus far, we have assumed that cadre units would be equipped similarly to AC units<br />
in peacetime by ignoring equipment costs. However, the extended time required to mobilize<br />
cadre units allows us to consider a number of alternative ways of reducing the equipment<br />
costs of cadre units below that of AC units during peacetime. This would make a cadre<br />
augmented force even more attractive than calculated in Paper I. While we do not integrate<br />
equipment costs into the analysis performed in Paper I, in this chapter, we consider how<br />
different equipping strategies might affect the cost and risk from a cadre augmented force.<br />
There are two types of equipment costs: purchase costs and operation and<br />
maintenance costs. If cadre units are used to expand the force (+6, +9, +18 BCT forces),<br />
then reducing the amount of equipment assigned to cadre units below that of AC units<br />
would provide an initial one-time savings in purchase costs and additional yearly savings in<br />
operation and maintenance costs. 82 If cadre units are integrated by changing the mix of the<br />
current force (<strong>Cadre</strong>Mix force), then there would be no one-time savings in purchase cost for<br />
cadre units replacing AC units because full equipment sets already exist for these units. 83<br />
Replacing RC units with cadre units could increase purchase costs if cadre units required<br />
more equipment in peacetime than RC units. 84 However, this is unlikely, because cadre units<br />
take longer to mobilize and would therefore have more time to acquire equipment before<br />
deploying. In both cases, cadre units would have lower operations and maintenance<br />
____________<br />
82 Additional one-time savings in purchase costs would be achieved over the long-term when new equipment<br />
sets are needed to replace old ones.<br />
83 Though again, there would be savings over the long-term as equipment is replaced.<br />
84 RC units are generally not provided full equipment sets.