Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation

-190- An Operational Analysis of Cadre
Table 3.2—Cadre Leaders Relative to Total Army
Grade Active Army (2008) 81 6 BCT 9 BCT 18 BCT
Officers
Colonel (O-6) 3,332 0% 1% 1%
Lieutenant Colonel (O-5) 8,548 1% 1% 2%
Major (O-4) 16,072 2% 2% 5%
Captain (O-3) 25,328 3% 5% 10%
Lieutenant (O-1, O-2) 15,268 9% 13% 26%
NCOs
Sergeant Major (E-9) 3,062 3% 4% 9%
First / Master Sergeant (E-8) 10,535 3% 5% 9%
Sergeant First Class (E-7) 35,861 3% 5% 10%
Staff Sergeant (E-6) 56,863 5% 8% 15%
Sergeant (E-5) 76,142 8% 12% 23%
At most, the largest cadre expansion requires 26 percent of the leaders not assigned
to combat units in any grade. Although some of these officers are assigned to non-combat
units, the number of leaders needed relative to the number not assigned to a unit is still high.
However, to rely on the existing force structure to provide leaders for cadre units in wartime
requires assuming that the duties performed by leaders not assigned to units could be
ignored in the event of a war. If this were true, then cadre leaders would not need to be
retained separately in peacetime and the peacetime cost of a cadre unit would be zero
because 100 percent of their cost would be assigned to other duties. However, it is likely that
the number of officers/NCOs not assigned to units would decrease if the number of active
combat units were reduced. Therefore, reducing the number of AC units under the
assumption that there would be enough leaders for cadre units within the existing force
structure is not advisable. If some AC units are to be replaced with cadre units, careful
consideration must to given to making sure there are a sufficient number of officers/NCOs
not assigned to units retained during this process.
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81 Department of the Army (2007a), p. 9 (estimate for September 30, 2008).