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Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation

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-171- An Operational Analysis of <strong>Cadre</strong><br />

cadre units discussed in this chapter provide cadre leaders with more realistic training<br />

experiences that could lead to increased proficiency. Leaders assigned to maintenance cadre<br />

units will be less experienced than they would be if another cadre organization was chosen.<br />

This means they will be less likely to be promoted which will also make cadre leadership<br />

positions more unattractive. 37<br />

Another concern is that cadre leaders from all types of cadre units would be less<br />

proficient than similar leaders assigned to active duty units. However, there is little concern<br />

about the wartime proficiency of these leaders because they would have at least six months to<br />

train with their unit’s junior personnel before being deployed. 38 Nonetheless, the overall<br />

leader development process still remains a concern. Rotating active personnel through cadre<br />

positions will slow the leader development process throughout the army. This is a significant<br />

drawback of creating cadre units with active duty personnel.<br />

The active army leader development problem could be alleviated by retaining cadre<br />

leaders in the RC rather than the AC. For this to work, these leaders would have to be priorservice<br />

personnel and the units would have to be based regionally. 39 Prior service RC leaders<br />

would have relevant leadership experience and would have enough time to practice their<br />

skills in wartime while junior personnel are recruited and trained. Additionally, a cadre unit<br />

with leaders in the RC would cost less than an AC cadre unit. The problems with<br />

____________<br />

37 This has been true for assignments of AC personnel to RC units: “The <strong>Army</strong> typically does not reward the<br />

active officers it assigns to reserve component support duty, and typically does not assign its best officers to<br />

that duty. Not surprisingly, therefore, active officers seek to avoid service in reserve-support positions.” [Jacobs<br />

(1994), p. 53]<br />

38 Officers maintained in cadre status during peacetime (not promoted or activated from the IRR) would have<br />

two years to hone their skills before being united with the junior personnel for their unit.<br />

39 This assumes that RC cadre leaders would train together in peacetime. Another possibility discussed in a<br />

later section is to retain cadre leaders in a “senior IRR.”

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