Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation
Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation
-170- An Operational Analysis of Cadre operations.” 36 In essence, the cadre prepares for its wartime duties as best as they can without having junior personnel to train. We begin by assuming that the cadre leaders in a maintenance unit would be in the AC and then discuss how and why we might consider retaining leaders in the RC. The maintenance cadre unit has only two advantages when compared to the other cadre duties examined in this section. First, leaders are constantly training for their wartime mission, albeit without junior personnel. This allows them more time to hone both their mobilization plans and their leadership skills. Other cadre organizations discussed in this section assign other duties; this can distract leaders from core unit tasks. Second, leaders of maintenance cadre units will “know” the equipment that they will use in wartime. Most other cadre organizations we examine would assign contractors to perform maintenance; this reduces the familiarity that leaders would have with the equipment. The maintenance cadre unit has two major disadvantages: high cost and reduced leader proficiency. As discussed in the previous chapter, if the cadre’s only duties are to maintain the unit, one hundred percent of the peacetime cost of cadre leaders is assigned to the cadre unit. Other cadre organizations discussed in this chapter assign a fraction of these costs to other accounts. Proficiency is also a concern with maintenance cadre units because although they have more time to focus on training for their wartime mission than other cadre units, they still lack junior personnel to train. The “command post exercises” proposed by CBO only go so far in replicating a real life combat situation. In order to fully practice maneuvers, the cadre leaders need junior personnel to direct. Lacking these personnel, training exercises become more like “busywork” than a training experience. Other types of ____________ 36 CBO (1990), p. 16
-171- An Operational Analysis of Cadre cadre units discussed in this chapter provide cadre leaders with more realistic training experiences that could lead to increased proficiency. Leaders assigned to maintenance cadre units will be less experienced than they would be if another cadre organization was chosen. This means they will be less likely to be promoted which will also make cadre leadership positions more unattractive. 37 Another concern is that cadre leaders from all types of cadre units would be less proficient than similar leaders assigned to active duty units. However, there is little concern about the wartime proficiency of these leaders because they would have at least six months to train with their unit’s junior personnel before being deployed. 38 Nonetheless, the overall leader development process still remains a concern. Rotating active personnel through cadre positions will slow the leader development process throughout the army. This is a significant drawback of creating cadre units with active duty personnel. The active army leader development problem could be alleviated by retaining cadre leaders in the RC rather than the AC. For this to work, these leaders would have to be priorservice personnel and the units would have to be based regionally. 39 Prior service RC leaders would have relevant leadership experience and would have enough time to practice their skills in wartime while junior personnel are recruited and trained. Additionally, a cadre unit with leaders in the RC would cost less than an AC cadre unit. The problems with ____________ 37 This has been true for assignments of AC personnel to RC units: “The Army typically does not reward the active officers it assigns to reserve component support duty, and typically does not assign its best officers to that duty. Not surprisingly, therefore, active officers seek to avoid service in reserve-support positions.” [Jacobs (1994), p. 53] 38 Officers maintained in cadre status during peacetime (not promoted or activated from the IRR) would have two years to hone their skills before being united with the junior personnel for their unit. 39 This assumes that RC cadre leaders would train together in peacetime. Another possibility discussed in a later section is to retain cadre leaders in a “senior IRR.”
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-170- An Operational Analysis of <strong>Cadre</strong><br />
operations.” 36 In essence, the cadre prepares for its wartime duties as best as they can<br />
without having junior personnel to train. We begin by assuming that the cadre leaders in a<br />
maintenance unit would be in the AC and then discuss how and why we might consider<br />
retaining leaders in the RC.<br />
The maintenance cadre unit has only two advantages when compared to the other<br />
cadre duties examined in this section. First, leaders are constantly training for their wartime<br />
mission, albeit without junior personnel. This allows them more time to hone both their<br />
mobilization plans and their leadership skills. Other cadre organizations discussed in this<br />
section assign other duties; this can distract leaders from core unit tasks. Second, leaders of<br />
maintenance cadre units will “know” the equipment that they will use in wartime. Most other<br />
cadre organizations we examine would assign contractors to perform maintenance; this<br />
reduces the familiarity that leaders would have with the equipment.<br />
The maintenance cadre unit has two major disadvantages: high cost and reduced<br />
leader proficiency. As discussed in the previous chapter, if the cadre’s only duties are to<br />
maintain the unit, one hundred percent of the peacetime cost of cadre leaders is assigned to the<br />
cadre unit. Other cadre organizations discussed in this chapter assign a fraction of these<br />
costs to other accounts. Proficiency is also a concern with maintenance cadre units because<br />
although they have more time to focus on training for their wartime mission than other<br />
cadre units, they still lack junior personnel to train. The “command post exercises” proposed<br />
by CBO only go so far in replicating a real life combat situation. In order to fully practice<br />
maneuvers, the cadre leaders need junior personnel to direct. Lacking these personnel,<br />
training exercises become more like “busywork” than a training experience. Other types of<br />
____________<br />
36 CBO (1990), p. 16