Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation
Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation
-162- An Operational Analysis of Cadre 2.4—ACTIVATE THE INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE Another way to reduce the number of officers and NCOs retained in cadre units during peacetime is to activate members of the IRR to fill senior positions. 26 To analyze the cost of cadre BCTs designed to be filled with IRR personnel in wartime, we calculated the percentage of officers and NCOs per BCT in each grade that could be activated in wartime to fill slots in cadre BCTs for each of the cadre expansions. 27 We assumed that sixty-three percent of IRR personnel in each grade would show up when called upon. 28 For each cadre force, we then calculated the relative peacetime cost of maintaining a cadre BCT when we explicitly plan to fill some senior leadership slots with IRR personnel. Figure 2.5 shows the structure and cost of cadre BCTs in each of the cadre augmented forces examined in this dissertation. ____________ 26 CBO (1990) outlined a cadre force in which they expected to fill out about 70 percent of the slots in a cadre division with IRR personnel. However, the army IRR was much larger in the early 1990s (nearly 400,000 personnel) than it is in the early 21 st century (just over 100,000 personnel). [DoD (2005), p. 161] 27 Distribution of Army IRR personnel by grade was extracted from DoD (2005). See Appendix C for more detail on calculations. 28 Korb (2005) notes that 37 percent of IRR personnel called for service in Iraq and Afghanistan failed to respond. The 63 percent that did respond provide a pessimistic estimate for the number of soldiers available given that many of those that failed to respond initially would eventually respond making this number closer to the 70% enlisted and 90% officer rate used by the Army for mobilization planning purposes. [Howe (2005), p. 22]. However, it should be noted that the Army chooses who to activate and it will select those individuals who are more likely to respond. Therefore, if all IRR personnel were called, the response rate may be lower than that estimated in Korb (2005).
-163- An Operational Analysis of Cadre Figure 2.5—Structure and Cost of Cadre BCTs Relying on IRR Activation Pay Grade AC BCT +6 Cadre BCTs +9 Cadre BCTs +18 Cadre BCTs CadreMix (16 Cad. BCTs) OFFICERS O-1 and O-2 129 0 37 83 77 O-3 113 0 4 58 52 O-4 36 0 11 24 22 O-5 9 1 4 6 6 O-6 2 1 1 2 2 CW1 & CW2 23 20 21 22 22 CW3 5 4 4 5 5 CW4 2 1 1 2 2 CW5 0 0 0 0 0 ENLISTED E-1 through E-3 858 0 0 0 0 E-4 1124 0 0 0 0 NCOs E-5 609 0 0 0 0 E-6 343 285 304 324 321 E-7 160 149 152 156 156 E-8 44 40 42 43 43 E-9 12 10 11 11 11 SUMMARY Total 3,469 511 593 735 718 Percentage 100% 15% 17% 21% 21% Relative Cost 100% 20% 24% 31% 30% The IRR can provide a significant number of officers and NCOs during wartime. Activating IRR personnel to fill cadre units in wartime can significantly reduce the peacetime cost of a cadre BCT. For the six, nine, and 18 BCT expansions, the relative cost of a cadre unit that relies on the activation of senior IRR personnel is 20, 24, and 31 percent respectively. The relative cost of a cadre unit relying on IRR activation in the CadreMix force is 30 percent. These are about the same as the relative cost of cadre units that rely on increased promotion rates. There is some question as to whether senior officers and NCOs in the IRR would be capable of command without additional training. However, officers and NCOs would have at minimum six months to train before their junior personnel were ready to join a cadre unit. 29 This should be sufficient time for them to hone their leadership skills. ____________ 29 Six months is the minimum amount of time to recruit and train junior personnel for a cadre unit that is mobilized with no lead time. Most officers and NCOs would have much more time (two years) to prepare. Ideally, activated IRR officers and NCOs would be assigned to the later deploying cadre units.
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-163- An Operational Analysis of <strong>Cadre</strong><br />
Figure 2.5—Structure and Cost of <strong>Cadre</strong> BCTs Relying on IRR Activation<br />
Pay Grade AC BCT +6 <strong>Cadre</strong> BCTs +9 <strong>Cadre</strong> BCTs +18 <strong>Cadre</strong> BCTs <strong>Cadre</strong>Mix (16 Cad. BCTs)<br />
OFFICERS O-1 and O-2 129 0 37 83 77<br />
O-3 113 0 4 58 52<br />
O-4 36 0 11 24 22<br />
O-5 9 1 4 6 6<br />
O-6 2 1 1 2 2<br />
CW1 & CW2 23 20 21 22 22<br />
CW3 5 4 4 5 5<br />
CW4 2 1 1 2 2<br />
CW5 0 0 0 0 0<br />
ENLISTED E-1 through E-3 858 0 0 0 0<br />
E-4 1124 0 0 0 0<br />
NCOs E-5 609 0 0 0 0<br />
E-6 343 285 304 324 321<br />
E-7 160 149 152 156 156<br />
E-8 44 40 42 43 43<br />
E-9 12 10 11 11 11<br />
SUMMARY Total 3,469 511 593 735 718<br />
Percentage 100% 15% 17% 21% 21%<br />
Relative Cost 100% 20% 24% 31% 30%<br />
The IRR can provide a significant number of officers and NCOs during wartime.<br />
Activating IRR personnel to fill cadre units in wartime can significantly reduce the peacetime<br />
cost of a cadre BCT. For the six, nine, and 18 BCT expansions, the relative cost of a cadre<br />
unit that relies on the activation of senior IRR personnel is 20, 24, and 31 percent<br />
respectively. The relative cost of a cadre unit relying on IRR activation in the <strong>Cadre</strong>Mix force<br />
is 30 percent. These are about the same as the relative cost of cadre units that rely on<br />
increased promotion rates. There is some question as to whether senior officers and NCOs<br />
in the IRR would be capable of command without additional training. However, officers and<br />
NCOs would have at minimum six months to train before their junior personnel were ready<br />
to join a cadre unit. 29 This should be sufficient time for them to hone their leadership skills.<br />
____________<br />
29 Six months is the minimum amount of time to recruit and train junior personnel for a cadre unit that is<br />
mobilized with no lead time. Most officers and NCOs would have much more time (two years) to prepare.<br />
Ideally, activated IRR officers and NCOs would be assigned to the later deploying cadre units.