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Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation

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-160- An Operational Analysis of <strong>Cadre</strong><br />

Table 2.4— Percentage of Enlisted Personnel Retained in <strong>Cadre</strong> Units Planning for<br />

Increased Wartime Promotions<br />

+6 BCTs +9 BCTs +18 BCTs <strong>Cadre</strong>Mix<br />

E-6 62 % 75 % 87 % 86 %<br />

E-7 77 % 85 % 92 % 91 %<br />

E-8 56 % 71 % 85 % 84 %<br />

E-9 85 % 90 % 95 % 94 %<br />

Increasing promotion rates and decreasing promotion intervals for enlisted<br />

personnel reduces the number of NCOs that would need to be retained in peacetime cadre<br />

units. Increased enlisted promotion rates in the first two years of a war will also decrease the<br />

number of privates in the force because they are promoted more rapidly. However, the cadre<br />

augmented forces discussed in this dissertation assume that enlisted recruiting will increase in<br />

the first years of a war, which will offset the decrease in the number of privates created by<br />

higher promotion rates. However, this increases the size of the wartime end-strength<br />

expansion required to fill-out cadre units because some junior personnel that would have<br />

gone to fill junior positions in cadre units are needed to replace junior personnel in the<br />

existing force who have been promoted. This adds to the risk of relying on increased<br />

promotions to create new leaders for cadre units.<br />

2.3.3—Structure and Cost<br />

We used the promotion results for officers and enlisted personnel discussed above to<br />

determine the peacetime structure and cost of a cadre BCT that relies on increased wartime<br />

promotions to fill some officer and NCO positions. 24 We assume that these units retain no<br />

____________<br />

24 This analysis does not take into account the feasibility and cost of training the additional officers and NCOs<br />

who are promoted. Winkler et al (1999) find that only about 63 percent of the capacity of the NCO training<br />

system is used [Winkler et al (1999), p. 14]. Therefore, the cost of additional training using existing facilities will<br />

likely be much smaller than the personnel costs we are considering here. It is also likely that the army will<br />

shorten the length of these courses in wartime as it has for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan [Bender (2007b)].

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