Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation

-159- An Operational Analysis of Cadre
2.3.2—Enlisted Personnel
We performed the same analysis for enlisted personnel based on average promotion
rates from 2000 20 and a wartime case where each promotion rate is increased by five percent
in each grade (the average increase in promotion rates for officers). 21 The wartime enlisted
promotion policy also shortens the promotion interval from E-5 to E-6 from 48 months to
42 months. 22 Table 2.3 shows the promotion rates and intervals by rank for the base and
wartime promotion policies.
Table 2.3—Enlisted Promotion Rates and Intervals
Rank Base Wartime
Rate Interval Rate Interval
E-4 77 % 24 mo. 81 % 24 mo.
E-5 67 % 12 mo. 70 % 12 mo.
E-6 41 % 48 mo. 43 % 42 mo.
E-7 42 % 24 mo. 44 % 24 mo.
E-8 37 % 24 mo. 39 % 24 mo.
E-9 13 % 24 mo. 14 % 24 mo.
Based on the change in promotion policies detailed above, Table 2.4 shows the
percentage of enlisted personnel per BCT in each grade that would need to be retained in
peacetime if the army relied upon the wartime promotion policy described above to fill
senior enlisted openings during wartime. 23
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20 Derived from Shukiar et al (2000), p. 28.
21 As far as we can tell from the data we have, promotion rates for enlisted personnel did not increase during
the wars in Iraq in Afghanistan. Therefore, we created a wartime promotion rate increase that is similar to the
increase that took place for officers.
22 Enlisted promotion intervals were derived from Department of the Army (2007c), p. 23 (for E-5, E-6) and
p. 91 (for E-7 through E-9). These are consistent with the intervals in Williamson (1999).
23 Here, we assume that only senior NCOs (above E-5) are retained during peacetime as suggested in CBO
(1990). If all NCOs are retained, the cost of cadre units that rely on increased promotion increases significantly
because increasing promotion rates hollows out the lower ranks (through E-5) thereby requiring a significant
number of E-5s to be retained in peacetime.