Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation
Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation
-154- An Operational Analysis of Cadre could find no new officers or NCOs during wartime to assign to cadre units. 8 In terms of grades, this would mean retaining all officers (O-1 and above) and NCOs (E-5 and above). Figure 2.2 shows the structure of this type of cadre BCT. Figure 2.2—All Officers and NCOs Cadre BCT AC BCT % Retain Cadre BCT OFFICERS Lieutenant (O-1 and O-2) 129 100% 129 Captain (O-3) 113 100% 113 Major (O-4) 36 100% 36 Lieutenant Colonel (O-5) 9 100% 9 Colonel (O-6) 2 100% 2 Chief Warrant Officer 1 & 2 (CW1, CW2) 23 100% 23 Chief Warrant Officer 3 (CW3) 5 100% 5 Chief Warrant Officer 4 (CW4) 2 100% 2 Chief Warrant Officer 5 (CW5) 0 100% 0 ENLISTED Private (E-1 through E-3) 858 0% 0 Specialist / Corporal (E-4) 1124 0% 0 NCOs Sergeant (E-5) 609 100% 609 Staff Sergeant (E-6) 343 100% 343 Sergeant First Class (E-7) 160 100% 160 First / Master Sergeant (E-8) 44 100% 44 (Command) Sergeant Major (E-9) 12 100% 12 SUMMARY Total 3469 43% 1487 A cadre BCT retaining all officers and NCOs during peacetime would have 1,487 personnel, which is about 43 percent of the wartime strength of the unit. If cadre leaders are retained on active duty and all costs of retaining these leaders are assigned to the cadre unit during peacetime, this type of unit would cost 56 percent of an AC unit during peacetime. 9 This estimate is based on the assumption that the full cost of the peacetime cadre is assigned to the cadre unit and that all cadre leaders would be retained on active duty during peacetime. This would only be the case for some types of cadre units discussed in Chapter Three. When cadre leaders are assigned other peacetime duties such as training, their entire cost is not fully assigned to the cadre unit and their peacetime cost could be significantly ____________ 8 We begin with this pessimistic case to motivate the development of other alternatives. It is unlikely that all officers and NCOs would be retained because some officers could be recruited, activated from the IRR, or promoted more rapidly in wartime. 9 Cost calculations are explained in Appendix B.
-155- An Operational Analysis of Cadre lower. When cadre leaders are retained in the reserve, their cost would also be significantly lower. Nonetheless, Paper I shows that even at 56 percent, a cadre augmented force still significantly reduces annual costs. 2.2—RETAIN ALL SENIOR OFFICERS AND NCOS In a 1990 report, CBO envisioned that cadre divisions would retain “on active duty about 3,000 senior non-commissioned officers (paygrades E-6 and above) and officers (paygrades O-2 and above) for each division.” 10 Figure 2.3 depicts a cadre BCT that retains all senior officers and NCOs as defined by CBO. 11 Figure 2.3—Senior Officers and NCOs Cadre BCT AC BCT % Retain Cadre BCT OFFICERS Lieutenant (O-1 and O-2) 129 50% 65 Captain (O-3) 113 100% 113 Major (O-4) 36 100% 36 Lieutenant Colonel (O-5) 9 100% 9 Colonel (O-6) 2 100% 2 Chief Warrant Officer 1 & 2 (CW1, CW2) 23 100% 23 Chief Warrant Officer 3 (CW3) 5 100% 5 Chief Warrant Officer 4 (CW4) 2 100% 2 Chief Warrant Officer 5 (CW5) 0 100% 0 ENLISTED Private (E-1 through E-3) 858 0% 0 Specialist / Corporal (E-4) 1124 0% 0 NCOs Sergeant (E-5) 609 0% 0 Staff Sergeant (E-6) 343 100% 343 Sergeant First Class (E-7) 160 100% 160 First / Master Sergeant (E-8) 44 100% 44 (Command) Sergeant Major (E-9) 12 100% 12 SUMMARY Total 3469 23% 814 A cadre BCT retaining all senior officers and NCOs during peacetime would have 814 personnel assigned during peacetime, which is about 23 percent of wartime strength. If all the costs of retaining cadre leaders were assigned to the cadre unit during peacetime, this type of unit would cost 37 percent of an AC unit during peacetime. This cost is significantly ____________ 10 CBO (1990), emphasis added. The 3,000 personnel proposed by CBO are not all senior officers and NCOs. 11 The data from U.S. Army Armor Center (2005) does not distinguish between O-1 and O-2 so we assume that half of the officers in the O-1/O-2 category are O-1s and half are O-2s.
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-155- An Operational Analysis of <strong>Cadre</strong><br />
lower. When cadre leaders are retained in the reserve, their cost would also be significantly<br />
lower. Nonetheless, Paper I shows that even at 56 percent, a cadre augmented force still<br />
significantly reduces annual costs.<br />
2.2—RETAIN ALL SENIOR OFFICERS AND NCOS<br />
In a 1990 report, CBO envisioned that cadre divisions would retain “on active duty<br />
about 3,000 senior non-commissioned officers (paygrades E-6 and above) and officers<br />
(paygrades O-2 and above) for each division.” 10 Figure 2.3 depicts a cadre BCT that retains<br />
all senior officers and NCOs as defined by CBO. 11<br />
Figure 2.3—Senior Officers and NCOs <strong>Cadre</strong> BCT<br />
AC BCT % Retain <strong>Cadre</strong> BCT<br />
OFFICERS Lieutenant (O-1 and O-2) 129 50% 65<br />
Captain (O-3) 113 100% 113<br />
Major (O-4) 36 100% 36<br />
Lieutenant Colonel (O-5) 9 100% 9<br />
Colonel (O-6) 2 100% 2<br />
Chief Warrant Officer 1 & 2 (CW1, CW2) 23 100% 23<br />
Chief Warrant Officer 3 (CW3) 5 100% 5<br />
Chief Warrant Officer 4 (CW4) 2 100% 2<br />
Chief Warrant Officer 5 (CW5) 0 100% 0<br />
ENLISTED Private (E-1 through E-3) 858 0% 0<br />
Specialist / Corporal (E-4) 1124 0% 0<br />
NCOs Sergeant (E-5) 609 0% 0<br />
Staff Sergeant (E-6) 343 100% 343<br />
Sergeant First Class (E-7) 160 100% 160<br />
First / Master Sergeant (E-8) 44 100% 44<br />
(Command) Sergeant Major (E-9) 12 100% 12<br />
SUMMARY Total 3469 23% 814<br />
A cadre BCT retaining all senior officers and NCOs during peacetime would have<br />
814 personnel assigned during peacetime, which is about 23 percent of wartime strength. If<br />
all the costs of retaining cadre leaders were assigned to the cadre unit during peacetime, this<br />
type of unit would cost 37 percent of an AC unit during peacetime. This cost is significantly<br />
____________<br />
10 CBO (1990), emphasis added. The 3,000 personnel proposed by CBO are not all senior officers and NCOs.<br />
11 The data from U.S. <strong>Army</strong> Armor Center (2005) does not distinguish between O-1 and O-2 so we assume<br />
that half of the officers in the O-1/O-2 category are O-1s and half are O-2s.