Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation

Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation

07.06.2014 Views

-152- An Operational Analysis of Cadre shorter delays to recruit and/or activate leaders, and (2) more rapid training of junior personnel. 5 If we could estimate the relationship between cadre structure and readiness, we could calculate a direct tradeoff between cost savings from a cadre augmented force and stress on the AC. 6 However, it is difficult to estimate this relationship due to a lack of data. Additionally, the readiness of a cadre unit is determined by factors not related to the size of the cadre such as delays in activation. Therefore, we do not attempt to estimate the relationship between cadre unit structure and readiness. Since cadre units have never been purposely maintained in the U.S. Army, there is little guidance to determine the appropriate size and structure of a cadre unit. Previous cadre proposals have provided some guidance, but there is no established standard. This chapter explores a variety of options for structuring cadre units in peacetime and calculates their costs. In order to perform the analyses in this section, we extracted the grade structure of a BCT from U.S. Army Armor Center (2005) for each of the three types of BCTs (infantry, Stryker, and heavy). 7 The grade structures of these three types of BCTs differ only slightly so we chose to focus on infantry BCTs. Figure 2.1 shows the grade structure of an infantry BCT. ____________ 5 The justification for these is as follows: (1) cadre units that retain more leaders in peacetime need to recruit/activate fewer leaders in wartime and (2) additional leaders would reduce the ratio of junior personnel to leaders; this would reduce the amount of time it would take to develop proficient junior personnel. 6 This would allow DoD decision makers to determine size of a cadre unit based how they value stress on the AC relative to cost savings. 7 The full structure for all three types of BCTs is shown in Appendix A.

-153- An Operational Analysis of Cadre Figure 2.1—Infantry BCT Structure Rank Personnel Percent OFFICERS Lieutenant (O-1 and O-2) 129 3.7% Captain (O-3) 113 3.3% Major (O-4) 36 1.0% Lieutenant Colonel (O-5) 9 0.3% Colonel (O-6) 2 0.1% Chief Warrant Officer 1 & 2 (CW1, CW2) 23 0.7% Chief Warrant Officer 3 (CW3) 5 0.1% Chief Warrant Officer 4 (CW4) 2 0.1% Chief Warrant Officer 5 (CW5) 0 0.0% ENLISTED Private (E-1 through E-3) 858 24.7% Specialist / Corporal (E-4) 1124 32.4% NCOs Sergeant (E-5) 609 17.6% Staff Sergeant (E-6) 343 9.9% Sergeant First Class (E-7) 160 4.6% First / Master Sergeant (E-8) 44 1.3% (Command) Sergeant Major (E-9) 12 0.3% SUMMARY Total 3469 100.0% 57 percent of an infantry BCT is comprised of enlisted personnel in grades E-1 through E-4. In a cadre unit, personnel in these grades would not be retained in peacetime because they can be filled with new recruits in wartime. Enlisted personnel in these grades have, on average, two years of experience. Newly recruited enlisted personnel in cadre units would have about the same experience profile by the time a cadre unit is ready to deploy. Cadre units may or may not retain a full complement of officers and NCOs in other grades. The following sections explore variations in the number of officers and NCOs retained in cadre units and their relative costs. 2.1—RETAIN ALL OFFICERS AND NCOS The structure of a cadre unit depends on which elements of a unit one thinks cannot be procured in wartime. The most pessimistic assumption would be to assume that you

-152- An Operational Analysis of <strong>Cadre</strong><br />

shorter delays to recruit and/or activate leaders, and (2) more rapid training of junior<br />

personnel. 5 If we could estimate the relationship between cadre structure and readiness, we<br />

could calculate a direct tradeoff between cost savings from a cadre augmented force and<br />

stress on the AC. 6 However, it is difficult to estimate this relationship due to a lack of data.<br />

Additionally, the readiness of a cadre unit is determined by factors not related to the size of<br />

the cadre such as delays in activation. Therefore, we do not attempt to estimate the<br />

relationship between cadre unit structure and readiness.<br />

Since cadre units have never been purposely maintained in the U.S. <strong>Army</strong>, there is<br />

little guidance to determine the appropriate size and structure of a cadre unit. Previous cadre<br />

proposals have provided some guidance, but there is no established standard. This chapter<br />

explores a variety of options for structuring cadre units in peacetime and calculates their<br />

costs.<br />

In order to perform the analyses in this section, we extracted the grade structure of a<br />

BCT from U.S. <strong>Army</strong> Armor Center (2005) for each of the three types of BCTs (infantry,<br />

Stryker, and heavy). 7 The grade structures of these three types of BCTs differ only slightly so<br />

we chose to focus on infantry BCTs. Figure 2.1 shows the grade structure of an infantry<br />

BCT.<br />

____________<br />

5 The justification for these is as follows: (1) cadre units that retain more leaders in peacetime need to<br />

recruit/activate fewer leaders in wartime and (2) additional leaders would reduce the ratio of junior personnel<br />

to leaders; this would reduce the amount of time it would take to develop proficient junior personnel.<br />

6 This would allow DoD decision makers to determine size of a cadre unit based how they value stress on the<br />

AC relative to cost savings.<br />

7 The full structure for all three types of BCTs is shown in Appendix A.

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