Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation

-90- A Budgetary Analysis of Cadre
whether a cadre augmented force can significantly reduce cost are those about the DoD’s
willingness to stress the AC while cadre units mobilize and the future rotation guidance for
the AC. If the DoD is unwilling to place some stress on AC units while cadre units mobilize
or if the AC is rotated less intensively in the future, a cadre augmented force could actually
increase annual costs. Assumptions about cadre readiness (delay and rate) are also important,
but a cadre augmented force reduces cost even under our worst-case assumptions for these
parameters.
Combinations of the extreme values for the various assumptions discussed above
could also lead to a cadre augmented force being less attractive. If the mobilization rate is
slower than assumed in this paper (less than three BCTs/year), then a cadre augmented force
will not decrease costs if either the peacetime cost of a cadre unit or the frequency of war is
high. The same is true for the mobilization delay. If it takes longer to mobilize cadre units
than assumed in this paper (36 months), then a cadre augmented force could increase cost if
either the peacetime cost of cadre a unit or the frequency of war is high. However, ceteris
paribus, a cadre augmented force continues to reduce costs even if both the peacetime cost
of cadre and the frequency of war are high.
There are two global assumptions that we did not address in the sensitivity analyses
in this paper. First, throughout this paper, we assume that force structure decisions are
driven by rotation. Second, we assume that the reserves are used as an operational, not
strategic, reserve. To conclude our budgetary analysis of a cadre augmented force we return
to these assumptions and discuss their implications for the results in this paper.