Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation

-86- A Budgetary Analysis of Cadre
7.1.3—Cadre Structure and Readiness
The readiness of a cadre unit will likely depend on the peacetime structure of that
unit. The more leaders a unit retains in peacetime, the faster it can mobilize. If we were able
to estimate the relationship between cadre structure and readiness, we could calculate a
direct tradeoff between stress on the AC and the cost savings from a cadre augmented force,
using the results in this section. However, it is difficult to estimate the relationship between
cadre structure and readiness. Previous estimates of cadre readiness have been vague and
there has been no attempt to estimate the relationship between the number of cadre leaders
retained during peacetime and the time a cadre unit would require to prepare to deploy. We
do not attempt to make such an estimate in this dissertation, but such an estimate would be
extremely valuable in providing the DoD with the requisite data to determine the
appropriate cadre unit structure based on how they weigh the cost savings from a cadre
augmented force against stress on the AC.
7.2—RC READINESS
In response to ARFORGEN, the Army is attempting to reduce post-mobilization
training for RC BCTs. 98 Reductions in RC post-mobilization training could reduce the cost
savings from a cadre augmented force because fewer RC BCTs can be replaced with cadre
BCTs. 99 Table 7.1 shows the effect of RC post-mobilization training time on the average
long-run cost savings from trading RC units for cadre units. 100
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98 A Defense Science Board (DSB) report states: “The goal is to limit post-mobilization training to just 45 days
allowing for 320 days of deployed ‘boots on the ground’ in country. [DSB (2007), p. 22]. Also see: Freedberg
(2007).
99 This calculation assumes that there is no additional pre-mobilization training cost for RC units.
100 The sensitivity of peacetime cost savings is similar.