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The German-Dutch Communist Left - Libcom

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political factors which led to this bankruptcy. <strong>The</strong> causes he considered all raised the burning question: what is<br />

the real state of class-consciousness, its degree of revolutionary maturity?<br />

It is significant that Gorter hesitated in explaining the International’s bankruptcy. He insisted strongly on the fact<br />

that the revisionists and the Kautskyite centrists were “equally responsible for the nationalism and the<br />

chauvinism of the masses”. 308 On the other hand, like Pannekoek and Robert Michels before him, he sketched<br />

out the theory developed in the 1920 Reply to Lenin, on the opposition between ‘masses’ and ‘leaders’. 309 <strong>The</strong><br />

proletarian masses had been deprived of the capacity for revolutionary action by the bureaucratisation of the<br />

social democracy, with its army of paid officials and functionaries: “<strong>The</strong> centre of gravity shifted [...] from the<br />

masses to the leaders. A workers’ bureaucracy was formed. However, the bureaucracy is by its very nature<br />

conservative.” 310<br />

But Gorter, who was a Marxist to the core, could not be satisfied with a merely sociological analysis. 311 <strong>The</strong><br />

question of the organisation of parties as emanations of the International, was the decisive one. For Gorter, as<br />

later for the Italian <strong>Communist</strong> <strong>Left</strong> 312 the International came before the national parties, not the other way<br />

round. <strong>The</strong> 2 nd International’s bankruptcy was to be explained essentially by its federalist nature: “In reality, the<br />

2 nd International’s debacle came because it was not international. It was a conglomeration of national<br />

organisations, and not an international organism”. 313<br />

In the end, all these causes explain the retreat of proletarian consciousness in the war. <strong>The</strong> proletariat was<br />

“severely weakened”, and “spiritually demoralised”. But for Gorter, just as for Lenin and Pannekoek, this was a<br />

withdrawal, not an irreparable defeat. <strong>The</strong> revolution would necessarily spring from the war.<br />

<strong>The</strong> future<br />

<strong>The</strong> very conditions of capitalism’s evolution provided the objective conditions necessary for the unification of<br />

the world proletariat. <strong>The</strong> revolution could only be world-wide: “For the first time in world history, the whole<br />

proletariat is today united thanks to imperialism, in peace as in war, as a whole, in a struggle which cannot be<br />

conducted without the common agreement of the international proletariat, against the international<br />

bourgeoisie.” 314<br />

However, Gorter insisted strongly that the revolution would unfold as a long term process “extending over<br />

decades and decades”. <strong>The</strong> “spiritual factors” would he decisive. Above all, the class struggle demanded a<br />

radical change in tactics; it would be a struggle adapted to the imperialist epoch, no longer by the means of trade<br />

union or Parliament, but by the mass strike. Although it remained undeveloped, this point – which appears on the<br />

pamphlet’s final page – prefigured the left communist conception, which was developed fully in 1920.<br />

308 Gorter, ibid.<br />

309 Gorter, like Lenin, carefully distinguished between the leaders who has betrayed internationalism, and the masses who<br />

passively suffered a nationalism which was only attached to “a primary instinct of self-preservation’ (idem, p. 63). Roland<br />

Holst, by contrast, in her pamphlet Het socialistisch proletariaat en de vrede (Amsterdam: J.J. Bos, 1915), tried to show that<br />

the problem was not the betrayal by the leaderships of the social-democratic parties, but the existence of the ‘national<br />

factor’, which had submerged internationalism in 1914. Unlike Gorter, she came to the conclusion that it was “untrue that<br />

the present war, in its essence and its expressions is nothing other than a struggle between super-capitalist groups for<br />

financial and economic hegemony” (idem, p. 13). She did not speak of social democracy’s betrayal, and called on the latter<br />

to “take account of national feeling, as a living and very tough ideology, which has not had its day, but is also rooted in the<br />

present” (idem, 12). This was still a typically “kautskyist” viewpoint. Roland Holst spoke in favour of liberty and ‘peace’.<br />

310 Gorter, idem, p. 72.<br />

311 This is what Robert Michels tends to do in his book published in Leipzig in 1911: Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens in der<br />

modernen Demokratie. Pannekoek corresponded with him briefly in 1905. See: C. Malandrino, ‘Lettere di Anton<br />

Pannekoek a Roberto Michels (1905)’, in: Annali della Fondazione Luigi Einaudi, XIX, Torino , 1985, pp. 467-492.<br />

312 Such as Bilan, the periodical of the Italian <strong>Communist</strong> Fraction (‘bordigist’) during the 1930s.<br />

313 Gorter, op. cit., p. 127.<br />

314 Idem, p. 22.<br />

96

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