The German-Dutch Communist Left - Libcom
The German-Dutch Communist Left - Libcom
The German-Dutch Communist Left - Libcom
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Despite the party’s theoretical solidity, there was a serious risk that the SDP would slide into sectarianism. <strong>The</strong><br />
party’s links with the industrial proletariat had loosened since the split. Less than half its members worked in<br />
factories or workshops; a considerable number were office workers and teachers. <strong>The</strong> party leadership – at least<br />
until 1911 111 – was composed of intellectuals, solid theoreticians 112 but – except for Gorter – often sectarian and<br />
doctrinaire. This leadership was tending to transform the SDP into a sect.<br />
<strong>The</strong> struggle against sectarianism within the SDP was posed from the beginning. In May 1909 Gerrit Mannoury<br />
– one of the leaders of the party and a well-known mathematician – declared that the SDP was the one and only<br />
socialist party, since the SDAP had become a bourgeois party. Gorter, the one who had fought most bitterly<br />
against Troelstra, vigorously opposed this conception. At first in the minority, he showed that although<br />
revisionism did lead towards the bourgeois camp, the SDAP was above all an opportunist party within the<br />
proletarian camp. This position had direct implications at the level of propaganda and agitation in the class. It<br />
was in fact possible to fight alongside the SDAP, whenever the latter still defended a class position, without<br />
making the slightest theoretical concessions to it.<br />
‘Sect or party?’, this was the question Gorter posed very clearly to the whole party in November 1910. 113 <strong>The</strong><br />
question was whether the SDP was going to associate itself with a petition for universal suffrage launched by the<br />
SDAP. <strong>The</strong> SDP, like all the socialist parties of the day, fought for universal suffrage. <strong>The</strong> central question was<br />
therefore the analysis of political struggles. At first, only a small minority, led by Gorter, supported the idea of<br />
the petition and agitation for universal suffrage. It needed all Gorter’s influence for a small majority to emerge in<br />
favour of common activity with the SDAP. Gorter showed the danger of a tactic of non-participation, which ran<br />
the risk of pushing the party into total isolation. Towards the SDAP, which was certainly “not a true party” but<br />
“a conglomeration, a mass trooped together under a band of demagogues”, the tactic had to be that of a “hornet”<br />
stinging it in the right direction. This attitude was to remain that of the party until the war, when the SDAP<br />
crossed the Rubicon by voting for war credits (see Chapter 3).<br />
<strong>The</strong> evolution of the SDAP in fact confirmed the validity of the combat which the Tribunists had waged against<br />
the revisionists from the outset. <strong>The</strong> latter were being progressively drawn into the ideology and state apparatus<br />
of the bourgeoisie. In 1913, the SDAP pronounced itself in favour of military mobilisation in case of war, and<br />
Troelstra openly proclaimed adherence to nationalism and militarism: “We must do our duty” he wrote in the<br />
SDAP daily. 114<br />
Strengthened by its electoral success in 1913, the SDAP, which had won 18 seats, was ready to accept three<br />
‘portefeuilles’ ( ministerial posts) in the new left liberal government of Dirk Bos (1862-1916) – party “Vrijzinnig<br />
Democratische Bond”, or VDB, founded in 1901. <strong>The</strong> participation in a bourgeois government would have<br />
meant the total abandonment of its remaining proletarian principles by Troelstra’s party; it was becoming a<br />
bourgeois party integrated into the state apparatus. However, there was a last, weak proletarian reaction within<br />
the party: at its Congress in Zwolle (known as ‘portefeuilles’ congres’) a small majority (375 against 320)<br />
emerged, led by Troelstra, opposed to ministerial participation. 115 It is true that the agitation against participation<br />
111 In 1911, a number of workers entered the SDP leadership: men like Barend Luteraan, who played an active part in “De<br />
Zaaier” youth movement during the war, and then at the head of the CPH opposition during 1919-21.<br />
112 Willem van Ravesteyn was a historian and librarian; Cornelis Ceton, a biology teacher; Gerrit Mannoury was a famous<br />
mathematician and logician; Johannis A. N. Knuttel (1878-1965) was a member of the Philology and Literary Commission<br />
of the <strong>Dutch</strong> Literary Society, writer-compiler for the Dictionary of <strong>Dutch</strong> language (Woordenboek der Nederlandse Taal).<br />
[See: Biografisch woordenboek van het socialisme en de arbeidersbeweging in Nederland, <strong>The</strong> Hague, 1986-2002, and:<br />
Biografisch Woordenboek van Nederland, Amsterdam, 1979-2002.]<br />
113 ‘Sekte of Partij’, in: De Tribune, 19 Nov. 1910. Gorter lucidly pointed out that an organisation’s small size was no<br />
guarantee, and was in fact as great a danger as the opportunism of a mass organisation: “Our enemies condemn the small<br />
group to impotence by exclusion: and in a small group, there is the danger that it may close in on itself. This danger<br />
threatens the small organisation, even if its principles are the best in the world. This danger also threatens our own small<br />
party”.<br />
114 Het Volk, 19 May 1913.<br />
115 S. de Wolff, op. cit., p. 121. Rosa Luxemburg, who was ill, informed on the <strong>Dutch</strong> situation, nonetheless pointed to the<br />
SDAP as an example of ‘intransigence in the International, against’ ministerialism. <strong>The</strong> radical attitude of Troelstra in the<br />
45