The German-Dutch Communist Left - Libcom

Chapter 10 FROM THE “MARX – LENIN – LUXEMBURG FRONT” TO THE
COMMUNISTENBOND SPARTACUS” (1940-1942)
The Dutch council communism and the war
The war that the council communists had judged inevitable broke out in September 1939. Nevertheless, it took
the Dutch Left two months to publish its theoretical review Radencommunisme, while its agitational review
Proletenstemmen, had ceased publication in July. The atmosphere of war weighed more heavily in Holland –
which remained neutral in the conflict – and seemed to paralyse the council communists as their organisation
remained very slipshod and totally unprepared for clandestine work should they be forced underground.
Nevertheless, the first issue of Radencommunisme (November 1939), stood firm on its internationalist principles.
Analysing the causes of the war, it refused to differentiate between the ‘democratic’ and ‘fascist’ camps. Taking
up the analyses of revolutionaries during World War I, it concluded: “... it is world capitalism, as an economic
system, which is responsible for this war, and not any particular country”.
Radencommunisme showed that the unleashing of war by Germany had been made possible “by the
concentration of all capital in the hands of the state’ and “by a growing exploitation of the working class” in
Germany. This phenomenon, according to the review, was identical in the ‘democratic’ camp, since “In a short
space of time, England built up its own ‘totalitarian’ capitalist organisation”.
As far as the military situation was concerned, the GIC judged it ‘unlikely’ that: The Netherlands – like Belgium
and Scandinavia – would remain ‘neutral’; without saying so explicitly, it suggested that Holland could be
occupied by either the Anglo-French or the German camp. In any case, “in a few years, the map of the world will
be totally modified” by the conflict. Refusing to forecast the victory of one the other camps, it insisted that the
peace, like the Peace of Versailles after World War I, would be devastating.
The international communists were equally cautious as to the outcome of the war. Revolutionary activity by the
proletariat at the end of the conflict, as in 1917, was less a hypothesis than an “incalculable factor”: “It is certain
that after some years of war a new, formidable social force will hinder the war plans of the capitalists, but we do
not know what will be the breadth or depth of its effects”. 1096
The GIC thought that a revolutionary movement could only arise in Germany. The disappearance of the ‘old
workers’ movement’ would leave room for movements of the masses. This would in some sense repeat the
events of Germany 1918, which this time would end with a victory of the proletariat.
Faced with war and the threat of the extension of military operations onto Dutch territory, the Council
Communists seemed hesitant in undertaking their anti-war revolutionary propaganda. It is true that they had no
desire to conduct a ‘frontist’ policy with Sneevliet’s RSAP, which at the beginning of 1940 proposed the
formation of an anti-war front (Nederlands Anti-Oorlog Front) regrouping syndicalists, anarchists and trotskyists
for common action. They refused to join up with this Front. 1097
Up to the invasion of The Netherlands on 10 th May 1940, agitation against war was undertaken by a few local
‘councilist’ currents. Thus the group of s’Gravenhage (The Hague) regularly brought out a bulletin with a
significant title: Soldatenbrieven (Soldiers’ letters) with a resolutely anti-militarist content. Addressed to soldiers
1096 ‘De wortel van de oorlog’ (The Roots of the War), p. 2.
1097 Cf. M. Perthus: Henk Sneevliet revolutionair-socialist in Europa en Azië (Nijmegen: SUN, 1976), pp. 414-415.
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