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anarchist group like the BAS was characteristic: it proved that the demarcation between council communism and anarchism was not very sharp. This was clear to the GIC, but not to the other groups. The conference did however have positive results, in the immediate if not in the long term. It established selection criteria in the council communist movement: the participation in economic struggles was the principle criterion. As a result, the majority of the KAPN left the movement, to bring out its own review: De Arbeidersraad (‘The Workers’ Council’) in 1933. Although a partisan of the party, like the old KAPN, this group progressively evolved towards trotskyist and even anti-fascist positions (see Chapter 7). The second positive result was the publication of texts in the different reviews, coming from the movement as a whole, as well as the joint distribution of pamphlets. 744 Finally, the election of a joint commission of the groups apparently showed an active concern to regroup in the future. However, this unique attempt at uniting groups with a ‘councilist’ orientation was to be a failure. The opening of a counter-revolutionary course, after Hitler’s accession to power in 1933, only accentuated the centrifugal tendencies within the Dutch movement, as it did elsewhere in the international ‘councilist’ movement. Hitler’s coming to power and its consequences. – The GIC and the German situation Exclusively preoccupied with questions agitating the ‘Unionist’ movement in Germany, the GIC paid little attention to the rise of nazism, a striking sign of the counter-revolution on the march. The questions of organisation of the Unionen, of the economic crisis, and the more theoretical ones of the peasantry and the period of transition (see below) seemed more important. This weakness faced with a political problem as urgent as the rise of the counter-revolution was the result of a failure to evaluate the historical period thoroughly. Class movements would necessarily be born from the world crisis, in the form of wildcat strikes, which would lead directly to the revolution. As a current of the communist left, the GIC considered the nazi movement as the expression of the offensive of ‘monopolist capitalism’ against the proletariat, whose social base was the petty-bourgeoisie proletarianised by the crisis. To combat nazism, the only proletarian tactic was the resurgence of massive class struggle, in the form of spontaneous anti-union movements. Any attempt at anti-fascist alliances with the left parties would lead to the betrayal of proletarian principles. To beat nazism, the German proletariat could only count on itself and above all on the resurgence of international class struggle in the main centres of capitalism. The GIC, like the German revolutionary groups (KAPD, KAU), and the council communist groups in the USA and elsewhere, intransigently rejected the anti-fascist united front. 745 For them, German social democracy and the KPD had taken part in the crushing of the proletariat: the SPD physically in 1919, and the KPD ideologically in competing from 1923 on with the nazi movement on the nationalist terrain. At the end of 1932, the KAPD stressed that “Hitler encompassed the heritage of Noske, the party of Hitler the heritage of social democracy”. 746 As for the 744 Anti-parliamentary pamphlets were distributed by the GIC, the LAO, and the Radencommunist group: 3,000 copies of Kiest Kobus onze man!, and an (anonymous) pamphlet by Pannekoek, De arbeiders, het parlement en het communisme were distributed in 1933. 745 Thus the KAZ wrote in 1932: “A United Front with ‘each and every one’ of such people, completely forgets each and every SPD act since 1914; this would mean forgetting the sea of proletarian blood – no less than that spilt by the brown plague – that the SPD has spilt in the interests of capital... fascism is not opposed to bourgeois democracy: on the contrary it is its continuation by other means. Every party which has a bourgeois policy, even if one finds workers’ groups in its ranks, is an accomplice of fascism and at the same time one of its fractions. A united front with these gentlemen, for the sole reason that they claim to defend “workers’ interests” is to abandon socialism and push the workers into the fascist bandwagon” [‘Einheitsfront und Einheitsfrontstaktik’, in: KAZ (Berlin), No. 7, July 1932]. Although Kampruf, the organ of the KAU, had the same position as the KAPD, locally some sections of the KAU gave in to the temptation of the antifascist united front. Thus in 1932, the Leipzig section joined the SAP in an anti-fascist front. It was the same for the Pirna section in Saxony [see KAZ No. 7, July 1932] with the SPD and the KPD. 746 KAPD pamphlet, Der Totentanz des Kapitalismus, Berlin, 1932, p. 7. (Web: ) 198
KPD, “it has raised demagogy to a principle, and it has been beaten by the master of demagogy, Hitler”. 747 The disastrous result of this policy of ideological diversion was that “a great part of the KPD’s supporters went over to Hitler”. 748 It was only at the end of 1932 that the GIC began to evaluate the perspectives for the workers’ movement arising from the fascist wave. The nazi movement corresponded to the attempt by big capital to establish “the absolute dictatorship of the possessing classes” with the support of the middle classes. 749 The GIC’s analysis was completely banal, and showed a lack of political deepening which was only to be overcome after Hitler’s coming to power. The Dutch remained optimistic. While they emphasised that fascism had no solution to offer on the economic level, they thought that it would bring “the most violent class struggle”. Hitler’s accession to power finally forced the GIC to adopt a sharper political position. It is significant that Pannekoek took up the pen to orientate council communist policy more concretely. 750 He tried to analyse the causes and consequences of the proletarian defeat in Germany, as well as the immediate and long term perspectives for workers and revolutionaries throughout the world. The defeat of the German proletariat: like the Italian communist left in 1933 751 , Pannekoek showed clearly that the final triumph of Hitler completed the social-democratic counter-revolution begun in November 1918 with Ebert’s and Scheidemann’s coming to power. Like an astronomical revolution, the counterrevolution had completed its rotation. Hitler did not come to power to prevent the outbreak of the revolution – the stalinist thesis at the time 752 , – but to complete the counter-revolution begun 14 years earlier by German social democracy: “One can in no way call “counter-revolution” the circular movement (“revolution”) in Germany, since that presupposes a revolution preceding it. The true counter-revolution began on 9 th November 1918 in Berlin, when Ebert and Scheidemann entered the government”. 753 The establishment of a ‘society of violence’, the replacement of parliamentarism by a dictatorial government, the “suppression of bourgeois liberties and the most elementary human rights for certain groups of the population”, concentration camps for SPD and KPD members, the persecution of the Jews, were all so many facts which showed that the counter-revolution had come full circle. It was the world economic crisis which allowed big capital to complete the counter-revolution. To lead its “assault against the proletariat” German capital found its auxiliary troops in the nazi movement, whose cadres were petty-bourgeois students and army officers. Economically, nazism corresponded to the attempt by German capital to achieve “a certain autarchy”. 747 Idem. 748 Idem. 749 GIC pamphlet: De Beweging van het kapitalistisch bedrijfsleven (‘The Movement of Capitalist Industry’), Oct. 1932, pp. 34-35. The author was B.A. Sijes. 750 Anonymous (Pannekoek), ‘De omwenteling in Duitsland’, in: PIC, No. 9, April 1933. 751 See our work on The ‘Bordigist’ Current 1919-1999, Italy, France, Belgium, Chapters 3 & 4, op. cit. 752 Following the analysis’ of the Komintern, the KPD thus declared in 1930: “The progress of fascism is in no way the sign of the ebb of the proletarian movement, but on the contrary the counterpart to its revolutionary rise, the necessary accompaniment to the maturity of a revolutionary situation” [Rote Fahne, 15 th June 1930.] Thus nazism was considered as the necessary last stage of the revolution. We know what was the practical result of this ‘theory’ in the German situation... Before the GIC, the KAPD had already in 1928 clearly demonstrated the real significance of fascism: “It is non-sense to define fascism as a means of the defence [of capital] against the persistent threat of proletarian mass action. It is more the consequence of a deficiency of the proletariat, which because of the economic pressure born of post-war relationships, had started the insurrection. Its role is to accelerate capitalist reconstruction” [KAZ No. 48, 1928.] Like the Italian Left, the German Left showed the interpenetration of fascism and democracy: “Democracy fascises itself, it readily makes alliances with dictators; and the dictators cloak themselves in democracy” [KAZ (Berlin), No. 7, 14 th Feb. 1931.] 753 ‘De omwenteling in Duitsland’, idem. 199
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PHILIPPE BOURRINET The Dutch and Ge
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The Dutch and German Communist Left
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General studies ...................
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INTRODUCTION Despite the theoretica
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In fact, it was not the GIC, but th
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history of the Dutch communist curr
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Chapter 1: Origins and Formation of
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1862-1866, 1871-1872); these conser
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Dutch and German workers’ movemen
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However, this ‘radicalism’ of D
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emained an internationalist. It is
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a formidable weapon against the lef
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form the Tribunist movement: Mendel
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of the organisation. 31 He only dev
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The support given to the various re
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Using the pretext of the struggle a
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the end of 1903. 57 By contrast, a
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Bolsheviks had deputies in the Duma
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imposed to form an organised fracti
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was obliged to include in the pream
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‘right’ 100 - which was based i
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This was the beginning of an increa
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carried out by the SDP - in the for
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The growth of Dutch imperialism cou
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Wijnkoop’s suggestion, the SDP’
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evolution. 125 Right up until the w
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helped to write the pamphlet addres
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section, supported a counter-resolu
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Chapter 2 Pannekoek and ‘Dutch’
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The philosophical bases of radical
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Wrongly presented by its opponents
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is most necessary. Only knowledge g
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ended in defeat - but whatever help
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The Dutch Left never considered the
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ourgeois revolutions, thinks of not
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eligious faith in the success of th
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organisations they had so patiently
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forces... The most backward country
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mass strikes; the proletariat’s s
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‘Great Night’: “[passive radi
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economic, and whose political domin
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letter to Paul Lafargue (20 th June
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Luxemburg in urging a clear rejecti
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explicit criticism of their leaders
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As in most of the belligerent count
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the main goal was the return to pea
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Gorter’s analyses were remarkable
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political factors which led to this
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During 1915, opposition to the war
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inform its readers about the Confer
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It is noteworthy that Roland Holst
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powerful opposition to this policy
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The workers’ reaction was immedia
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concealed the Wijnkoop leadership
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Lenin was quite right to emphasise
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“Don’t you feel, little by litt
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dissolved itself. There only remain
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Chapter 4 THE DUTCH LEFT IN THE KOM
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Spartakusbund not rejected particip
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However, the circular of the Komint
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Kommunist, publication of the Breme
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Russians - like Trotsky 433 - no lo
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The resolution adopted by the confe
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Led by Wolffheim and Laufenberg, th
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Pannekoek’s great clear-sightedne
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Rühle’s anti-party current. But
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All these accusations fail to stand
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not that of a general staff, in whi
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democrats and bourgeois in the war
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The unions also resemble the state
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eal decision-making centre. In this
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communism extends from the Rhine to
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The NEP (New Economic Policy) in th
Page 148 and 149: and the workers, who had all been a
Page 150 and 151: However, all the left communists, G
Page 152 and 153: was more disastrous for the VKPD th
Page 154 and 155: At its 3 rd Congress, the Komintern
Page 156 and 157: when he was in fact in Spain at the
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Page 160 and 161: committee is also of the opinion th
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Page 166 and 167: private property”. They constitut
Page 168 and 169: side, of two KAPDs, with two papers
Page 170 and 171: intention of working for the reunif
Page 172 and 173: ‘old enemy’ Paul Levi. 650 Deth
Page 174 and 175: district in Amsterdam, condemning a
Page 176 and 177: THE GROUP OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIS
Page 178 and 179: the Dutch theoretical review Radenc
Page 180 and 181: the CPO decided to dissolve in orde
Page 182 and 183: political sleep by the crisis of th
Page 184 and 185: economic, rather than the political
Page 186 and 187: the nationalist, even anti-Semitic
Page 188 and 189: parliamentary stipend financed the
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Page 194 and 195: It was a party which dared not spea
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Page 202 and 203: would ‘awaken’ the German prole
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Page 206 and 207: Chapter 7 TOWARDS A NEW WORKERS’
Page 208 and 209: The evolution of the Dutch GIC towa
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Page 212 and 213: Secondly, by trying at all costs to
Page 214 and 215: In a contradictory way, the GIC rep
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Page 218 and 219: The function and functioning of the
Page 220 and 221: een eclipsed and replaced by a “d
Page 222 and 223: and developed since the birth of th
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Page 230 and 231: Bogdanov, the social process was re
Page 232 and 233: to construct a coherent and ordered
Page 234 and 235: “As soon as the proletarian class
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Page 244 and 245: “freedoms” and the introduction
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Russian capitalism. It was only con
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The unemployed workers of Amsterdam
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Unlike the Paul Mattick group in th
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The contribution by this group, whi
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Chapter 9 THE DUTCH INTERNATIONALIS
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workers’ councils”, the KAPN’
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impoverished peasants and, on the o
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The first ‘minority’ was formed
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iting, since the Dutch RSAP and the
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seems to have come from an ex-membe
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esult which appeared positive to th
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Chapter 10 FROM THE “MARX - LENIN
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to the previous history of Germany
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posterity a political, as much as a
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Council communist theory had a revo
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organisations together, including t
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This ‘broad’ policy towards oth
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The MLL Front played a considerable
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workers had been liquidated. A tota
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Chapter 11 The Communistenbond Spar
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political past, marked less by synd
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process, and “the [capitalist] sy
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organisation, once theoretical and
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organisation: “The Bond is a temp
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The implicit rejection of the Russi
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the ‘right’ to speak in the Ber
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slavenmaatschappij tot arbeidersmac
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In 1945-46, the Bond examined sever
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Luxemburg’s conception, it was fo
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draws in ever greater masses. [...]
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The onset of the Cold War left the
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- General rejection of all groups t
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disappeared in 1948. Canne-Meijer w
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Bond arrived at the idea that the R
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After World War II council communis
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joined the left wing of the SPD or
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Like SB, it paraded a strong anti-b
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If ‘councilism’ as an organised
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The history of the Dutch and German
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organisational discipline, both exp
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looked to changes in the sociologic
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The criticisms put forward by Geyer
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BIBLIOGRAPHY A bibliography on the
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Stan POPPE (1899-1991) archives: mi
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Rote Armee (constituted in April 19
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Korrespondenz-Blatt der KAPD, ‚an
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‘Monatsblätter aus der Jugendbew
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Nasha Duma, Sofia, Oct. - Dec. 1919
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THE NETHERLANDS The Dutch communist
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Uit eigen kring; intern orgaan (the
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(These latter two texts have been t
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There is a good choice of texts, tr
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Zur Psychologie des proletarisches
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Marxism: last refuge of the bourgeo
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(These texts are in Authier-Barrot,
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Der Kampf um die Macht in der Gegen
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Pamphlets by the Bulgarian left com
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REICHENBACH (Bernard), ‘Moscow 19
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‚Über Karl Korsch’, in Jahrbuc
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ROEGHOLT (Richter), Ben Sijes. Een
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JANEV (Nikola), Balgarskata komunis
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The ‘intellectual current’: lit
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MALANDRINO (Corrado), ‘Anton Pann
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BERENDSEN (Hans), & WEEDA (Rik), Ui
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HARMSEN (Ger), Historisch overzicht
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NGO VAN, Vietnam 1920-1945, révolu
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WINCKLER (Heinrich August), Arbeite
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Protokolle der Vereinigungs-Konfere
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Fondazione Giangiacomo Feltrinelli,
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CWI: Communist Workers’ Internati
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NSV: Nederlandsch Syndikalistisch V
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VOC: Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compa
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Blackwell (Russell) [alias: Negrete
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Fischer (Ruth) [Eisler (Elfriede),
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KAPN, 17, 138, 172, 187, 199, 204-2
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Most (Johann), 29 Mühsam (Erich),
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Rühle (Otto), 13, 17, 21, 62, 120,
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Vonk (group De), 324, 329, 337, 351
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