The German-Dutch Communist Left - Libcom

However, all the left communists, Gorter, Pannekoek and the KAPD were agreed in denouncing the counterrevolutionary
direction of the measures taken in the economic and political fields. From April 1921 the KAPD
through its delegates in Moscow denounced “the present forms which seem to come close to a sort of state
capitalism”. Moreover, after the 10 th Congress of the Russian party banned the Workers’ Opposition as an
organised fraction, and all fractions in general, workers’ democracy in the Bolshevik Party was dead: “After the
last Congress of the Russian Soviet republic, there can be no doubt that in Russia there is no dictatorship of the
proletariat but a dictatorship of the party”. 542 This position, which Gorter shared with the KAPD, was the
harbinger of a break with the Komintern.
The Russian question, and so the fate of the Komintern, became major preoccupations within the Dutch and
German communist left. From now on the fate of the Russian Revolution and the Komintern was played out in
Germany.
The 1921 March Action
Although limited to central Germany the March action was a serious defeat for the revolution in Germany. This
action took place as repeated defeats reduced the German proletariat to complete passivity. The Social
Democratic Interior Minister, Carl Severing (1875-1952), who made a name for himself in the Ruhr in 1920
through his talents as a ‘ruler’ by calling to the Reichswehr, had decided to ‘pacify’ Central Germany, where the
workers had kept their weapons. On 18 th March, the same day as the fall of Kronstadt, social democracy
militarily occupied Central Germany. This region was one of the strongest bastions of the two rival parties:
VKPD and KAPD. The KAPD, in spite of the split by the ‘Saxon’ Rühle tendency, led a very strong union
(AAU) in the Leuna factories, which had 2,000 members among 20,000 workers. Moreover, men like Max Hölz
and Karl Plättner (pseudonym: Braun), members of the KAPD very informally, it is true, were very popular in
central Germany for their ‘expropriation actions. 543 They were the military organisers of the party in this region.
It was in this context, with the German proletariat on the defensive, that the Executive of the Komintern or part
of it started to develop the theory of ‘forcing the revolution’. Men like Bela Kun were sent to Germany to incite
the VKPD to pass to the offensive, including through armed actions. Abruptly, the Executive of the Komintern
swapped the opportunist tactic of the ‘open letter’ to the unions proposing a ‘united front’, for this adventurist,
putschist one.
The call, launched by the VKPD, for the arming of workers and the general strike in the district of Halle, which
included the Leuna factories, met little echo. Faced with this passivity, Eberlein the old delegate of the KPD at
the First Congress of the Komintern even proposed to fake outrages against the VKPD to stir up the “indignation
of the masses”! Supported by the delegates of the Executive he advocated armed insurrection in Central
Germany at any price. 544
542 H. Gorter, ‘Partei, Klasse und Masse’, in: Proletarier, organ of the KAPD, No. 4, Berlin, March 1921.
543 Since 1920 the KAPD had formed clandestine combat organisations (Kampforganisationen), parallel to the party.
Concealed behind the ‘sporting clubs’ [Kommunistische Arbeitersportvereinigung], they were usually dismantled by the
police, as in Berlin in autumn 1920. Those which survived in Saxony, in Vogtland were very active, but autonomous. In
1921 a veritable ‘military centre’ was created under Plättner’s leadership [pseudonym: Schuster). The Oberste Aktionsrat
(‘Supreme Council of Action’) was detached from the KAPD, and particularly active in ‘expropriations’ and ‘military’
actions. The ‘actions’ of Plättner were parallel to those of Max Hölz. The latter, excluded from the KPD in autumn 1920,
joined the KAPD at the beginning of 1921. Plättner was, in reality, a more important, more theoretical’ element who had led
a sharp struggle against Rühle, in the form of pamphlets and writings. But, hostile to ‘individual actions’, the KAP in
Leipzig had excluded him in March 1921 [KAZ (Berlin), No. 54, July 1923, ‘K. Plättner and Genossen’). For the KAPD,
Plättner was a ‘Bakuninist’ element [KAZ (Berlin), No. 55, 1923]. The KAPD was thus far from supporting the practice of
‘individual actions’.
544 Cf. P. Broué, Révolution en Allemagne (1917-1923) (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1971), pp. 474-485. [English translation:
The German Revolution, 1917-1923 (London: ‘Historical Materialism’ Book Series 5, 2004).]
150