The German-Dutch Communist Left - Libcom
The German-Dutch Communist Left - Libcom
The German-Dutch Communist Left - Libcom
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not that of a general staff, in which the party commands the class like an army. <strong>The</strong> party did not command but<br />
led the revolution. <strong>The</strong> revolution could not be decreed but was the “work of the masses” and “broke out<br />
spontaneously”. While certain actions by the party could be the starting point of the revolution “this only<br />
happens rarely” – the decisive factor was the maturation of class consciousness, which prepared the spontaneous<br />
actions of the proletariat. <strong>The</strong> revolution was thus not engendered out of nowhere, but was the culmination of a<br />
development of consciousness. It was “psychic factors profoundly rooted in the unconsciousness of the masses”<br />
which created the apparent spontaneity of revolutionary activity. <strong>The</strong> function of the party was precisely “always<br />
to act and speak in a way that would awaken and fortify the class consciousness of the masses”. [Gorter’s<br />
emphasis.] 494<br />
This function of the party determined the structure and functioning of the communist organisation. Instead of<br />
regrouping enormous masses, at the price of watering down principles and contracting the opportunist gangrene,<br />
the party had to remain a “nucleus, hard as steel and pure as crystal”. 495 This idea of a nucleus-party implied a<br />
rigorous selection of militants. But the <strong>Dutch</strong> left did not make an eternal virtue out of small numbers: the<br />
organic growth of the party could only take place on the basis of a solid nucleus, not of whatever tactics. “In<br />
Western Europe we wish first to build very firm, very clear, and very strong (though at the outset perhaps quite<br />
small) parties, kernels, just as you did in Russia. And once we have those, we will make them bigger. But we<br />
always want them to be very firm, very strong, very “pure”. Only thus can we triumph in Western Europe.<br />
<strong>The</strong>refore we absolutely reject your tactics, Comrade”. 496<br />
Gorter – at the price of a paradox in his argumentation – got carried away by the polemic against the Komintern<br />
Executive, which saw the communist left as a ‘sect’: “A sect then, says the Executive Committee [...] Quite so, a<br />
sect, if you mean by that the initial nucleus of a movement which aims to conquer the world”. 497<br />
Equally blundering was the argumentation about the centralised functioning of the communist party. Following<br />
the KAPD, Gorter opposed a “party of leaders” to a “party of the masses”, a ‘dialectic’ which Pannekoek had<br />
rejected. It was evident that the whole left had been traumatised by the 1919 split in Heidelberg, where the<br />
minority, basing itself on the non-representative leadership of the KPD, which was exerting a dictatorship over<br />
the party, manoeuvred to exclude the majority. This leadership of Paul Levi, Heinrich Brandler and Clara Zetkin<br />
was opposing the will and orientation of the working class masses in the party. <strong>The</strong> ‘party of leaders’ was a party<br />
that did not develop internal democracy in the party, but the dictatorship of a clique, from the top downwards,<br />
justifying itself with reference to Lenin’s conception of ‘iron discipline’. Such parties could only crush any<br />
opposition. <strong>The</strong> ‘party of the masses’ and not the mass party, which Gorter rejected, was built “from the bottom<br />
up” on the basis of the revolutionary workers.<br />
Gorter, and with him the whole communist left with the exception of the anarchistic tendencies – did not deny<br />
the necessity for the party to function in a unified, centralised and disciplined manner. Gorter, who is so often<br />
wrongly portrayed as the Don Quixote of the ‘struggle against leaders’, in fact wanted ‘right guides’, who try<br />
only to determine the ‘right path’:<br />
“In Western Europe we still have, in many countries, leaders of the type of the Second International; here we are<br />
still seeking the right leaders, those that do not try to dominate the masses, that do not betray them; and as long<br />
as we do not find these leaders, we want to do all things from below, and through the dictatorship of the masses<br />
themselves. If I have a mountain-guide, and he should lead me into the abyss, I prefer to do without him. As<br />
soon as we have found the right guides, we will stop this searching. <strong>The</strong>n mass and leader will be really one.” 498<br />
<strong>The</strong> implication of these ambiguous formulations was that the KAPD was momentarily a party without real<br />
leaders without discipline and without centralisation. Which was not at all the case. Gorter seems to postpone to<br />
494 Offener Brief an den Genossen Lenin (1920), in F. Kool, Die Linke gegen die Partei-Herrschaft, op. cit., p. 485.<br />
495 Ibid.<br />
496 Idem, p. 446.<br />
497 Idem, p. 486.<br />
498 Idem, p. 419. <strong>The</strong> KAPD added a note to that paragraph, to strongly underline the shape of the new workers’ parties :<br />
„Von unten auf’, which could be translated in English by „rank and file“ or „grassroots“.<br />
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