07.06.2014 Views

The German-Dutch Communist Left - Libcom

The German-Dutch Communist Left - Libcom

The German-Dutch Communist Left - Libcom

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

<strong>The</strong> cause of opportunism in the Third International was the stagnation of the revolution and the weakness of the<br />

communist parties. As Pannekoek stressed, it was the defeats in <strong>German</strong>y in 1919 and 1920 which had led to a<br />

division of the communist movement into two tendencies: a radical tendency which defended “new principles”<br />

and sought to provoke a “clear and sharp separation”; and an opportunist tendency which “puts forward what<br />

unites rather than what separates”. This opportunism was all the more dangerous in that it very often resorted to<br />

“frenetic declamations” and could lead to putschism by “counting solely on a single big action”. Pannekoek<br />

clearly had in mind the attitude of Wijnkoop, who was a “radical of the phrase” par excellence, and of the<br />

USPD, which in January 1919 had pushed for the insurrection in Berlin. Such a tendency, which “is only<br />

interested in immediate results without any concern for the future” and which “remains at the surface of things<br />

instead of going to the root”, suffered from the disease of immediatism.<br />

Thus the <strong>Dutch</strong> left turned around Lenin’s accusation that the left was impatient: the real disease of communism,<br />

typified by the right, was immediatism, whose corollary was impatience and the search for ‘instant success’.<br />

It is interesting to note that while Gorter and Pannekoek both analysed the roots of immediatism, they saw<br />

different causes for it. For Gorter, there was no doubt that the Russian Bolsheviks in 1920 were still deeply<br />

revolutionary. <strong>The</strong>y were simply mistaken in the way they wanted to “accelerate the western European<br />

revolution” by trying to get “millions of men to take part in it immediately”. Pannekoek on the other hand<br />

stressed the fact that the Bolsheviks were playing a conservative role in the International by identifying with the<br />

Russian state and its “workers’ bureaucracy”. This state, from which the International had to be rigorously<br />

independent, was trying to find a modus vivendi with the West, at the risk of sacrificing the interests of the world<br />

revolution.<br />

<strong>The</strong> role of the communist party – ‘masses and leaders’<br />

In his pamphlet Lenin accused the <strong>Dutch</strong> and <strong>German</strong> left of having a circle mentality and of “denying the<br />

necessity of the party and of party discipline”. This was true for the Rühle current and the <strong>Dutch</strong> ‘councilists’ of<br />

the 1930s, but it was not at all true for Gorter and Pannekoek in the 1920s. 491 On the contrary, the <strong>Dutch</strong> left<br />

accorded a great importance to the role of the party, both before and during the revolution. But the party was not<br />

an end in itself: taking up Rosa Luxemburg’s conception, the <strong>Dutch</strong> theoreticians declared that communists<br />

“worked to prepare their own demise” in a communist society. 492<br />

<strong>The</strong> communist party could only be “a weapon” of the revolution, and a “pure” product of it: “<strong>The</strong> task can only<br />

be fulfilled if the <strong>Communist</strong> Party consists of politically truly conscious and convinced revolutionaries, who are<br />

ready for any deed, any sacrifice, and if all the half-baked and wavering elements are kept off by means of its<br />

programme, by action, and especially by the very tactics.<br />

“For only thus, only by preserving this purity, the Party will be able to make the class truly revolutionary and<br />

<strong>Communist</strong>, through its propaganda, its slogans, and by taking the lead in all actions. <strong>The</strong> Party can take the lead<br />

only by being always absolutely pure itself.” 493<br />

<strong>The</strong> function of the party was not therefore simply a programmatic one: it had an active function of propaganda<br />

and agitation. Even if the working masses were acting spontaneously, the party did not fall into spontaneism,<br />

which means lagging behind the action of the masses. <strong>The</strong> party did not regroup the masses but was their<br />

‘vanguard’, through its slogans and directives. <strong>The</strong> party oriented and ‘led’ the struggle. This leading role was<br />

491 Lenin, in his polemic against the left, takes along a quotation from the pamphlet by the ‘Unionist’ group in Frankfurt,<br />

which was close to Rühle. This group, led by Robert Sauer, soon left the KAPD to join the AAUD-E.<br />

492 A formulation taken from Henriëtte Roland Holst, ‘De taak der communistische partij in de proletarische revolutie’,<br />

De Nieuwe Tijd, 1920, pp. 520-529, 583-596, 610-624, 665-674, 751-763. Text in <strong>German</strong> in the pamphlet: Partei und<br />

Revolution (Vienna: Arbeiter-Buchhandlung, 1921) [Reprint, with an introduction by Cajo Brendel (Berlin: Kollektiv<br />

Verlag, 1972)].<br />

493 Gorter, in Frits Kool, op. cit., p. 485.<br />

135

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!