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The German-Dutch Communist Left - Libcom

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time, it had seats in parliament: Wijnkoop and Van Ravesteyn had become deputies. This had been made<br />

possible by an alliance with the little Socialist Party (SP), which had left the SDAP in 1917. Led by a leader of<br />

the NAS, Harm Kolthek 383 , the SP was openly pro-Entente. With the Social-Christians, the other component of<br />

this electoral ‘united front’, it won a seat in parliament.<br />

<strong>The</strong> opposition denounced this alliance as a ‘monstrous union’ with pro-Entente trade union elements, and<br />

pointed out that the electoral success was purely demagogic. <strong>The</strong> votes gleaned from the Unionists of the NAS<br />

had been won by a campaign which seemed to support the policy of the USA. <strong>The</strong> United States were holding<br />

the <strong>Dutch</strong> merchant fleet in American ports, to use them in the war against <strong>German</strong>y, in exchange for food<br />

supplies for Holland; Wijnkoop declared that these supplies should be acquired from the USA by any means<br />

possible. This policy was denounced vigorously by Gorter and the Bussum section, but only later, in<br />

November. 384 With Gorter, the opposition increasingly looked on Wijnkoop as another Troelstra, whose love for<br />

the Russian Revolution was ‘purely platonic’, and whose politics were purely parliamentarian. 385<br />

<strong>The</strong> approaching end of the war, accompanied by revolutionary upheavals, pushed the opposition’s struggle<br />

against Wijnkoop’s pro-Entente policy. More and more, it emphasised the danger of a parliamentary policy. 386 It<br />

also forcefully combated the revolutionary syndicalism of the NAS, which had begun to work with the reformist<br />

NVV, the union controlled by Troelstra’s party. We can see here in germ, the anti-parliamentarian and antiunion<br />

politics of the future <strong>Dutch</strong> <strong>Communist</strong> <strong>Left</strong>. This meant a break with the old ‘Tribunism’.<br />

<strong>The</strong> abortive revolution of November 1918<br />

<strong>The</strong> revolutionary events of November were a test of fire, that broke over a party expanding numerically, but<br />

threatening to break up.<br />

Events in <strong>German</strong>y, where the government fell at the end of October, created a real revolutionary atmosphere in<br />

<strong>The</strong> Netherlands. Mutinies broke out in army camps on 25 th and 26 th October 1918. <strong>The</strong>y followed a constant<br />

workers’ agitation against food shortages, during the months of September and October, in Amsterdam and<br />

Rotterdam.<br />

It was symptomatic that Troelstra’s official social democracy began to radicalise itself. <strong>The</strong> other SDAP chiefs<br />

were astonished to hear the party leader give impassioned speeches for the revolution, and for the seizure of<br />

power by the working class. To the stupefaction of the <strong>Dutch</strong> bourgeoisie, of which government was the newly<br />

one formed by the Catholic Ruijs de Beerenbrouck (1873-1936), Troelstra proclaimed himself their<br />

irreconcilable enemy:<br />

383 Kolthek, who was elected deputy, wrote for a liberal paper De Telegraaf, which was more vigorously pro-Entente. With<br />

the SP and the BvSC, the SDP won 50,000 votes – of which 14,000 for Wijnkoop in Amsterdam – in other words half the<br />

score of the SDAP. <strong>The</strong> three elected deputies formed a ‘revolutionary parliamentary fraction’.<br />

384 See: De Liagre Böhl, op. cit., p. 213.<br />

385 Gorter wrote an article identifying Wijnkoop with Troelstra, published under the headline ‘Troelstra–Wijnkoop’, in De<br />

Tribune of 18 th September 1918. De Tribune of 26 th October 1918 declared: “<strong>The</strong> directing committee’s love for the<br />

Russian Revolution is purely platonic. In reality, the greatest powers of its love are directed towards the extension of the<br />

party’s popularity and numbers with the help of allies in parliament”.<br />

386 <strong>The</strong> opposition did not yet reject parliamentarism as such; it sought a serious discussion within the workers’ movement to<br />

determine future tactics: “...important problems in this phase of the workers’ movement could not be clarified... On the<br />

subject of parliamentarism, the editorial commission takes the view that everyone should be able to give his opinion in De<br />

Internationale. However, this question is not yet exhausted... <strong>The</strong> same is true for participation or not in elections” (De<br />

Internationale, No. 9, 12 th October 1918, ‘Landelijke conferentie van De Internationale’). In 1915, Pannekoek (in: De<br />

Nieuwe Tijd, ‘De Sociaaldemokratie en de oorlog’, op. cit., pp. 137-151) had already condemned parliamentarism, which<br />

had become ‘non-revolutionary’, but he did not exclude the possibility of “a principled struggle well fought in Parliament”<br />

still having “a revolutionary value”.<br />

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