Chomsky on Anarchism.pdf - Zine Library

CHOMSKY ON ANARCHISM
strated to these people that the Vietcong could not guarantee
their security as it had been able to do before the bombing and
that the belief in an imminent victory for the Vietcong might
rum out to be dangerously false}3
In short, along with "confiscation of chickens, razing of houses, or destrucdon
of villages," we can also make effective use of I 00 pounds of explosives per person,
12 tons per square mile, as in Viemam, as a technique for controlling
behavior, relying on the principle, now once again confirmed by experiment,
that satisfaction of desires is a more imponant motivation in human behavior
than abstract appeals to loyalty. Surely this is extremely sane advice. It would,
for example, be absurd to try to control the behavior of a rat by winning its
loyalty rather than by the proper scheduling of reinforcement .
An added advantage of this new, more scientific approach is that it will
"modify rhe arrirudes with which counterinsurgency effons are viewed in the
United States"34 (when we turn ro the United States, of course, we are concerned
with people whose attitudes must be taken into account, nor merely
their behavior). It will help us overcome one of the main defects in the
American character, the "emotional reaction" that leads LIS to side with "crusaders
fo r the common man" and against a "ruthless, exploitative tyrant" ("that
there may be reality as well as appearance in this role-casting is not the point").
This sentimentality "frequently interferes with a realistic assessment of alternatives,
and inclines LIS instead toward a carping righteousness in our relations
with the beleaguered government we are ostensibly supporting"; it may be
overcome by concentration on control of behavior rather than modification of
attitudes or the winning of hearts and minds. Hence the new approach to
counterinsurgency should not only be effective in extending the connol of
American-approved governments, but it may also have a beneficial effect on LIS.
The possibilities are awe-inspiring . Perhaps in (his way we can even escape the
confines of our "guilt culture in which there is a tradition of belief in equaliry.
"
It is extremely imponant, Wolf would claim, that we develop a rational
understanding of insurgency, fo r "insurgency is probably the most likely type
of politico-military threat in the third world, and surely one of the most complex
and challenging problems facing United States policies and programs."
The primary objective of American foreign policy in the Third World must be
"the denial of communist control," specifically, the suppon of counrries that
are defending their "independence from external and internal communist
domination." The latter problem, defending independence from internal
Communist domination, is the crucial problem, particularly in Latin America.
We mUSt counter the threat by a policy of promoting economic growth and
modernization (making sure, however, to avoid the risks inherent in these
processes-cf. Mitchell), combined with "a responsible use offorce." No question
is raised about the appropriateness of our use of force in a country threat-
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