Chomsky on Anarchism.pdf - Zine Library

OBJECTIVITY AND LIBERAL SCHOLARSHIP
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rer in a recem book.32 Wolf considers (WO "theoretical models" for analyzing
insurgency problems. The first is the approach of the heartsand-minds school
of coumerinsurgency, which emphasizes (he importance of popular support.
Wolf agrees that it is no doubt "a desirable goal" to win "popular allegiance to
a governmem that is combating an insurgent movemenr," but this objective,
he argues, is nO( appropriate "as a concepmal framework fo r counterinsurgency
programs." His alternative approach has as its "unifying theme" the concept of
"influencing behavior, rather than attitudes." Thus, "confiscation of chickens,
razing of houses, or destruction of villages have a place in counterinsurgency
efforts. but only if they are done for a strong reason: namely, to penalize those
who have assisted the insurgenrs ... whatever harshness is meted out by government
forces [must be] unambiguously recognizable as deliberately imposed
because of behavior by the population that contributes to the insurgent movement."
Furthermore, it must be noted that "policies that would increase rural
income by raising fo od prices, or projects that would increase agricultural productivity
through distribmion of fe rtilizer or livesrock, may be of negative
value during an insurgency ... since they may actually facilitate guerrilla operations
by increasing the availabili ty of inputs that the guerrillas need." More
generally: "In setting up economic and social improvement programs, the crucial
point is to connect such programs with the kind of population behavior
the government wants ro promote." The principle is to reward the villages that
cooperate and to provide penalties for the behavior that the government is uying
ro discourage. ''At a broad, concepmal level, the main concern of counterinsurgency
efforts should be to influence the behavior of the population
rather than their loyalties and attitudes"; "the primary consideration should be
whether the proposed measure is likely (Q increase the cost and difficulties of
insurgent operations and help to disrupt the insurgent organization, rather
than whether it wins popular loyalty and SUppOH, or whether it contributes to
a more productive, efficient, or equitable use of resources."
Other scholars have elaborated on the advantages of Wolf's "alternative
approach," which concerns itself with control of behavior rather than the mystique
of popular support. For example, Morton H. Halperin, of the Harvard
Center for International Affairs, writes that in Vietnam, the United States "has
been able to prevent any large-scale Vietcong victories, regardless of the loyalties
of the people." Thus we have an empirical demonsuation of a certain principle
of behavioral science, as Halperin notes:
The events in Vietnam also illustrate the faCt that most people
tend to be motivated, not by abstract appeals, but rather by their
perception of the course of action that is most likely to lead to
their own personal security and to the satisfaction of their economic,
social, and psychological desires. Thus, for example,
large-scale American bombing in South Vietnam may have
antagonized a number of people; bur at the same time it demoll-