Chomsky on Anarchism.pdf - Zine Library

CHOMSKY ON ANARCHISM
ry and behavioral psychology. As he notes, "in a number of historical cases it
has been the bener-to-do peasant who has revolted while his poorer brothers
actively supported or passively accepted the existing order." The "behavioral
explanation" lies "in the relative docility of poorer peasants and the firm
authority of landlords in the more 'feudal' areas ... the landlord can exercise considerable
influence over his tenant's behavior and readily discourage conduct
inconsistent with his own interests."
In an imerview with the New Yo rk Times (Ocrober 15, 1967) Mitchell adds
an additional explanation for the fact that the most secure areas are those that
remain "essemially feudal in social structure": when the feudal structure is
eliminated, "there's a vacuum and that is ideal fo r the Vietcong because they've
gOt an organization (0 fill the vacuum." This observation points (0 a difficulty
that has always plagued the American effort. As Joseph Buttinger points out,
the Diem regime (00 was unable (0 experiment with "freely cOl1Stinned organizations"
because these "would have been captured by the Vietminh."29
Mitchell's informative study supports an approach (0 counterinsurgency
that has been expressed by Roger Hilsman, who explains that in his view, modernization
"cannot help much in a counterguerrilla program," because it
"inevitably uproots established social systems [and] produces political and economic
dislocation and tension." He therefore feels that popularity of governments,
reform, and moderniz.ation may be "important ingredients," bur that
their role in counterinsurgency "must be measured more in terms of their contributions
to physical security."30
Before leaving this symposium on social science and Vietnam, we should
take note of the scholarly detachment that permits one not to make certain
comments or draw certain conclusions. For example, John Bennett discusses
the important matter of "geographic and job mobility": "Under the dual
impact of improved opportunities elsewhere and deteriorating security at
home, people are willing to move to a hitherto unbelievable extent." No further
comment on this "willingness," which provides such interesting new
opportunities for the restructuring of Vietnamese society. John Donnell discusses
the unusual success of pacification in Binh Dinh Province, particularly
in the areas controlled by the Koreans, who "have tended ro run their own
show with their own methods and sometimes have not allowed the RD teams
sem from Saigon all the operational leeway desired," and who have been
"extremely impressive in eliminating NLF influence." Again, no commem is
given on these methods; amply reponed in the press,3l or on the significance
of the fact that Koreans are eliminating NLF influence from Vietnamese villages,
and nor allowing the Vietnamese governmem cadres the leeway desired.
Mitchell draws no policy conclusions from his study, but others have seen
the point: recall the remarks of the moderate scholars on the dangers of social
reform. Other scholars have carried the analysis much further. For example,
Charles Wolf, senior economist of the RAND Corporation, discusses the mat-
29