Chomsky on Anarchism.pdf - Zine Library

CHOMSKY ON ANARCHISM
out of consideration here a large range of viable political settlements," name.iy,
those that involve "the inclusion of the Viet Cong in a coalition government
or even the persistence of the Viet Cong as a legal organization in South
Vietnam." Such arrangements "are not acceptable"-to us, that is. The only
acceptable settlement is one "imposed by the GYN despite the persisting great
political power of the Viet Cong."
There is, of course, a certain difficulty: " ... the Viet Cong is too strong to be
simply beaten or suppressed." It follows, then, that we must provide inducements
to the Vietcong activists to join our enterprise. This should not prove
roo difficult, he feels. The Vietcong leadership consists basically of bureaucratic
types who are on the make. Cognitive dissonance theory suggests that this
"discontented leadership" has "the potential for making a total break when the
going gets too rough." We must therefore provide them with "a political
rationalization fo r changing sides." The problem is ideological. We must
induce a change in the "image of reality" of the Vietcong cadres, replacing their
"naive ideology," which sees the GVN as "American puppets and supporters of
exploiters, the tax collecrors, the merchants, the big landlords, the police, and
the evil men in the villages," by a more realistic conception. We can do this by
emphasizing hamlet home rule and preventing the use of military forces ro collect
rents, a suggestion which will be greeted with enthusiasm in Saigon, no
doubt. The opportunity ro serve as functionaries for a central government
which pursues such policies will attract the Vietcong cadres and thus solve our 27
problem, that of excluding from the political process the organization that
contains the effective political leaders.
Others have expressed a rather different evaluation of the human quality
and motivation of these cadres. For example, Joseph Buttinger contrasts the
inability of the Diem regime ro mobilize suppOrt with the success of the NLF:
" ... that people willing to serve their country were to be fo und in Vietnam no
one could doubt. The Vietminh had been able to enlist them by the tens of
thousands and to extract from them superhuman efforts and sacrifices in the
struggle for independence."27 Military reports by the dozens relate the amazing
heroism and dedication of the guerrillas. Throughout history, however,
colonial administrarors have had their difficulties in comprehending or coming
to grips with this phenomenon.
In the course of his analysis of Ollr dilemma in Vietnam, Pool explains some
of the aspects of our culture that make it difficult for us to understand such
matters clearly. We live in "a guilt culture in which there is a tradition of belief
in equality." For such reasons, we find it hard to understand the true nature of
Vietcong land redistribution, which is primarily "a patronage operation" in
which "dissatisfied peasants band together in a gang to despoil their neighbors"
and "then reward the deserving members of the cabal."
This terminology recalls Franz Borkenau's description of the "streak of
moral indifference" in the history of Russian revolutionism, which permitted